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CASPIAN REGION ENERGY RESOURCES AND ITS IMPACT TO THE EU ENERGY SECURITY

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Abstract: Energy security has emerged in recent years as one of the cornerstones of the European Union's foreign policy. The EU is highly dependent on imports of oil and gas, 35 per cent of which comes from Russia. Diversification of energy supplies is thus a key goal for the EU. The Caspian region contains some of the largest undeveloped oil and gas reserves in the world. The intense interest shown by the major international oil and gas companies testifies to its potential, it could become a major oil supplier in the future. Development of the region's resources still faces with obstacles. These include lack of export pipelines and the fact that most new pipeline proposals face difficulties due to security of supply considerations, transit complications, political and legal considerations and market uncertainties. There are also questions regarding ownership of resources, as well as incomplete and often contradictory investment regimes. This study focuses on the countries along the southern rim of the former Soviet Union that are endowed with significant oil and gas resources: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia, and Azerbaijan in Transcaucasia. Several neighboring states are also covered in the discussions of oil and gas transportation and markets. The Southern Energy Corridor (SEC), which aims to link Caspian Basin and potentially Middle East gas supplies to Europe, is one of the EU's six priority axes of energy infrastructures. The article provides an analysis of the EU's efforts in the wider Black Sea area to increase its energy security.

Keywords: Caspian countries, European Union, hydrocarbons, Southern Corridor, pipeline, energy security

INTRODUCTION

The dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 bore three states in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Their proven conventional natural gas reserves amount to 27.8 tcm (trillion cubic meters), 13.3% of the world's total. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), their total production will increase from 143 bcm (billion cubic meters) in 2009 to 265 bcm in 2035, and the region will become an important gas exporter. (Statistical Review of World Energy. 2012).

Table, presents the Central Asian states proven reserves, production, consumption and net exports in detail. The Central Asian states seek to derive maximum benefit from their rich natural gas reserves. Inheriting the Soviet pipeline network, they have relied on Russia for the bulk of their west-bound gas exports (see Table, for Central Asian exports by destination). *(Review of World Energy 2012).*

The Russian dominance on gas transit and the poor access to alternative markets have set value on Central Asian gas. In order to increase revenues from their gas exports, the Central Asian states search for alternative pipeline projects which will diversify their transit routes as well as export markets. However, pipelines carrying Central Asian gas to distant markets have to pass through multiple countries which have their own strategic interests. There are four major powers striving for potency in Central Asia: Europe and

Turkey, led by the USA in the West, Russia in the North, rapidly growing China in the East and Iran seeking to become a regional power in the South. The Russian reaction to political events in Ukraine in 2014, and specifically its annexation of Crimea, military involvement in the separatist movements in eastern Ukraine, and the Malaysian airlines MH17 disaster, has generated a great deal of commentary about European dependence on Russian energy in general and natural gas in particular. The price dispute which led to termination of Russian supplies to Ukraine in June 2014, and the possibility of interruptions of gas supplies to Europe, led to renewed calls for diversification of European gas supplies and reduction of Russian imports. The Caspian is of central interest for European energy security, although the supply chain from the region has been traditionally kept under Russian Federation control. However, for the past decade, the EU is becoming increasingly ambitious in planning Caspian pipelines that exclude Russian Federation's territory and the Nabucco Pipeline project was in the center of these strategic efforts for a considerable amount of time. The Caspian is therefore also at a crossroads between grand and conflicting energy interests of the Russian Federation and Europe.

Table 1 - Natural gas in Central Asia and Caspian Basin

Country	Production Bcm	Consumtion Bcm	Net exports bcm	Proven reserves	
				bcm	%
Azerbaijan	14.8	8.2	6.6	1.3	0.6
Kazakhstan	19.3	9.2	10.1	1.9	0.9
Turkmenistan	59.5	25.0	24.5	24.3	11.7
Uzbekistan	57.0	49.1	7.9	1.6	0.8
Total	135.8	83.3	42.5	27.8	13.4

Source:British Petroleum, 2012.Statistical Review of World energy

Table 2 - Natural gas exports from Central Asia and Caspian Basin

Exports to	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan
Russia	1.4	11.5	10.1	2.2
Iran	0.4	-	10.2	-
China	-	-	14.3	-
Turkey	3.8	-	-	-
Others	1.7	0.1	-	2.0

Source:British Petroleum, 2012. Statistical Review of World energy

By concentrating on the EU's aims of achieving greater diversification of energy supplies by importing gas from the Caspian Basin through the Southern Energy Corridor (SEC), the article argues that although there is an underlying tension between the geopolitical realities of the region, the EU has been able to become an important player in the energy security of the region, pushing forward its agenda including the geopolitical Nabucco pipeline, the flagship of the SEC. EU-supported SEC builds upon the oil and gas pipelines in order to prevent Russian monopoly over the Caspian Basin supplies. If the SEC is possible then it is mainly because of the path-dependent processes set off by

the east-west corridor, which inextricably connected the international position of Azerbaijan and especially Georgia and Turkey transit role between the Caspian Sea and Europe. Iran is the largest country in the Middle East with the capacity to pursue a serious international agenda. Consequently, an amicable relationship with Tehran, who could be convinced to act in the common interest of the region, would be highly beneficial for all parties involved.[1] Iran has gone from being a consumer of foreign technology and a pure exporter of oil to being an exporter of oil, gas and petroleum products, a manufacturer of petroleum sector equipment as well as a hub for energy connectivity in the region. The country has pipelines that are connected with Turkmenistan and Turkey. The EU's demand of Caspian gas could be supplied through Iran. This paper has two major aims: first to determine potential and importance of the countries. Second, to examine the realistic options for reducing European dependence on Russian gas. Further, examines the alternative gas options for reducing dependence on Russian gas; it also provides some idea of the possible supplies through the pipelines and the likely competitiveness of Russian versus alternative gas supplies. The analysis will be based on a mixture of documentary analysis and a review of previous literature. The documents are published by relevant factors, such as the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA). These documents provide necessary statistical information. This statistical data, in combination with previous literature on the different countries' energy policies will be instrumental to gain a full understanding of the Caspian region's energy security dynamics.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND ENERGY SECURITY

In the field of energy security and the study of energy resources it is not customary to employ a theoretically focused approach. Instead, most academics have opted for a descriptive or historical methodology, wherein a full description of the case at hand informs the reader of a specific situation. Given the fact that energy security is becoming an ever more important aspect of international relations, it is worthwhile to consider integrating theories of international relations (IR) within the energy security field. *(M.S. Crandall, 2006).* The question then remains which theory would be best suited to analyze matters of energy security. This is quite a complex matter, given the rather vast amount of theoretical perspectives within international relations. It would require a thorough discussion of each of these theories in the energy security context to provide a solid answer to that question. For the purposes of this paper, such a discussion is not feasible. However, we can present some initial reflections on arguably the two most dominant IR theories: realism and liberalism.

Realism is the oldest theory in international relations. Realists argue that the international system is defined by anarchy, and there is no central authority. *(G.Cenaks, 2010).*

Within that system states are sovereign and autonomous of each other. By consequence, realist scholars have little faith in the effectiveness of international institutions to contain the power of sovereign states. The realist vision on the world then rests upon four assumptions.[2] Firstly, survival is the principle goal of every state. This means that states will always primarily make sure they can defend themselves from attacks, be they of militarily (primarily) or economical nature. Secondly, states are considered to be rational actors. They will always rationally consider the best way to

maximize their survival potential. Thirdly, states all have some kind of military capacity and they do not know exactly how their neighbors would behave, thus making the world unpredictable and dangerous. Fourthly and lastly, the Great Powers, which are the states with the most military and economic might that dominate the international arena.

Liberalism (and its predecessor idealism) is the classical contender of realism in IR. Its core assumption is that national characteristics of states matter in international politics. This is completely different from realism, which assumes that all states have similar goals in the international arena. Instead liberalism claims that a state's ideological focus has a strong influence on its goals. Traditionally this argument has been used to differentiate between liberal states and others. The democratic peace theory, which claims that liberal states do not go to war with each other is a prime example of this differentiation. *(K.N. Waltz, 1979).*

Moravcsik has developed the liberal theory and claims it is based upon three assumptions. (M. Doyle,1997). Firstly, individuals and private groups, not states, are the most important actors in the international arena. Secondly, states represent a part of the domestic society, serving its interest. Thirdly, the combination of those preferences in the international system determines the behavior of states. The realist focus on balance of power and hegemony plays a secondary role at best. Furthermore, even though survival may still be an important goal, a state's economic and ideological interests can be equally important. Regarding the matter which theory is best suited to analyze energy security issues, A. *(Moravcsik,1997),* provide an interesting perspective, that will largely be adopted in this paper as well. They have attempted to integrate IR theory in matters of energy security and argue in favor of realism over liberalism. Political actors that belong to the liberal tradition (they mention former U.S. president Jimmy Carter as a prime example) claim that actors in the international arena are primarily interested in profit maximization in the energy market. However, realists argue that energy resources are not merely economic commodities, but are key elements in state power.[3] More energy resources equal more state power. That power is naturally affected both by the state's ability to extract and transport the resources, and their global demand. As such, Luft and Korin claim that resources such as oil and gas cannot be treated as merely economic commodities, as long as those have key strategic value. (G. Luft, A. Korin, 2009).

This paper is set clearly within the realist tradition. As such it will focus primarily on the action of states within the Caspian region and the power dynamics that come with energy security. Energy resources are material objects that have a clear political significance, which means that they belong very well in a materialistic ontology and a positivistic epistemology. The analysis that will follow is firmly based upon these assumptions.

1. A PROFILE OF THE CASPIAN BASIN, THE CASPIAN WATER PLATEAU

The Caspian is the world's largest enclosed or landlocked body of (salty) water – approximately of the size of Germany and the Netherlands combined. Geographical literature refers to this water plateau as the sea, or world's largest lake that covers an area of 386,400 km. The Caspian coastline shared by five riparian (or littoral) states.[4] Table below is described about proved reserves of natural gas in the Caspian countries and it shows average of barrels increasing by each year. Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan

proved oil reserves is increased from 1994 till 2014. (BP Statistical Review of World Energy)

Table 3 - Oil- Total proved reserves

Country	At end 1994 Thousand million barrels	At end 2004 Thousand million barrels	At end 2013 Thousand million barrels	At end 2014 Thousand million Tones	Thousand million barrels	Share of total	R/P ratio
Azerbaijan	1.2	7.0	7.0	1.0	7.0	0.4%	22.6
Kazakhstan	5.3	9.0	30.0	3.9	30.0	1.8%	48.3
Turkmenistan	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.1	0.6		6.9
Uzbekistan	0.3	0.6	**0.6**	0.1	0.6		24.3
Central Asia total:	7.3	17.2	42.6	5.1	38.2	2.2%	102.1

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy

Table 4 - Natural gas- Total proved reserves

Country	At end 1994 Thousand million barrels	At end 2004 Thousand million barrels	At end 2013 Thousand million barrels	At end 2014 Thousand million Tones	Thousand Million barrels	Share of total	R/P ratio
Azerbaijan	n/a	0.9	0.9	41.2	1.2	0.6%	68.8
Kazakhstan	n/a	1.3	1.5	53.2	1.5	0.8%	78.2
Turkmenistan	n/a	2.3	17.5	617.3	17.5	9.3%	
Uzbekistan	n/a	1.2	1.1	38.3	1.1	0.6%	19.0
Central Asia total:		5.7	21	750	21.3	11.3%	166

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy

The “Inner Circle” of the Caspian Basin consists of the five littoral (riparian) states, Russian Federation, Islamic Republic of Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. They are could be roughly divided the traditional (Russian Federation and Iran), and the three newcomers (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan).

Russian Federation

The Russian Federation controls the north-western shore of the Caspian Sea and only a negligible part of its extensive energy reserves appear to be located in the Caspian Basin. Therefore, the Russian Federation has adopted a strategy of involvement in the energy business of the other, better-endowed riparian states by means of joint resource development (production revenues) and granting access to the Russian oil and gas

pipeline system (transport revenues). The main players in this field are state-owned companies Gazprom, Rosneft, and Transneft as well as other large private energy enterprises like Lukoil, Sibneft or Yukos *(G. Cesnakas 2010).* From the 2000s the Russian Federation turned to bilateral and plurilateral agreements with Caspian littoral countries to secure its economic interests in the basin. Due to these efforts agreed upon the division of the Northern part of the Caspian with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, while still strongly the five-party. Although this agreement presents a good sign for the future, its major downside is that it is completely dependent on the good relations between littoral states and therefore dependent on the current geopolitical realities of the Caspian.

The top priority task in Russia's fuel and energy expansion is to create an integrated water and fuel-energy complex in Central Asia (under Russian management). One of the possible ways to carry out this task is to include Tajikistan in the water-energy consortium being created. Russia's goal is clear: it wants to strengthen its position as Turkmenistan's main partner in the energy sector and, in so doing, maintain control over the export of Turkmen gas. Today, the growth rates of production, including those of gas export, from the Central Asian countries is much higher than the rates of modernizing and developing their gas transportation systems. But the main gas artery from the region's states to Russia-the major gas Central Asia-Center pipeline – is currently operating to its limit. This relates to all three gas transportation countries: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Regarding intra-regional relations in general, Russia's concerns about the influence of the EU and the US in the Caspian Basin have increased. As for Iran, the historically adverse relations have improved in some areas as the two powers still share a number of mutual interests in the Caspian Basin, for instance their joint opposition to growing Western interference in regional affairs.

Islamic Republic of Iran

Iran holds 16% of global proven gas reserve. *(Anis H. Bajrektarevic, 2015).* Total gas production in 2014 was 172.6 bcm, while domestic consumption stood at 117.6 bcm. More than a third of domestic consumption is used for boosting oil production by pumping gas into maturing oil fields. In 2009, natural gas had a share of 57.9% of total energy supplies; oil was down at 40.8%. Foreign investment is all blocked due to US bilateral sanctions based on the Iran sanctions Act (1996), sanctions imposed by the UN and the EU. (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2015). It is in Russia's vital interest that Iran does not turn into a competitor on the EU gas markets. Iran is considered an attractive export route for oil and gas between Central Asia and Europe, and for oil from both Central Asia and Transcaucasia to the Persian Gulf. It already has a well-developed oil and gas infrastructure, including portions of pipeline that could be used for the routes mentioned above or for swaps. By some estimates, an Iranian route could prove significantly cheaper than other proposed pipelines. Foreign policy priorities have been affected by its past dominance as well as the religious ties with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Of the most concern are the Islamic Republic of Iran´ s relations with Azerbaijan, hampered due to Azerbaijan´s westward cooperation on energy matters.

Additionally, the ethnic Azeri minority makes up a quarter of Iran´s population. An economically strong and independent Azerbaijan, could potentially incite the Azeri population in Iran to start its own nationalistic movement and threaten its territorial

integrity. Azerbaijan to rise any further as a global oil player might as well be seen as Iran's strategic goal. *(M.S. Crandall 2006).*

There are serious doubts about the viability of the proposed Armenia–Georgia–Ukraine pipeline on economic and – following Russia's annexation of Crimea – geographical grounds. Aside from these options, gas exports to Europe via Turkey using existing infrastructure, seems the most feasible option prior to 2020.

Irrespective of the technical and geopolitical feasibility of these proposed routes, the second major uncertainty over the export of Iranian gas to Europe is the availability of sufficient gas for export markets over and above Iran's domestic requirements. With the required investment and technology, Iran could increase production capacity to around 210–230 bcm/year by 2018, but this is expected to be mainly allocated to domestic and regional export markets. After meeting growing domestic demand – expected to reach 200–220 bcm/year before 2020 – and supplying gas to the already contracted export markets of the neighboring countries of Turkey (10 bcm/year), Iraq (10 bcm/year), and Oman (5–10 bcm/year), any gas available for export to the rest of Europe is expected to remain marginal prior to 2020.(Statistical Review of World Energy 2009).

Beyond 2020, depending on how fast Iran can develop the remaining phases of the South Pars and other major discovered gas fields, the country's total production capacity could reach around 350 bcm/year by 2030. (Gerhard Mangott 2010). It is only then that significant exports to Europe can be envisaged, provided that the required infrastructure can be made available. Exports of around 10–20 bcm/year to Europe through Turkey via the existing infrastructure are possible in the 2020s, but it is unrealistic to imagine more substantial volumes becoming a reality until after 2030.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan's total energy production has increased almost three-fold from 27.9 million to 74.9 million oil equivalent mainly due to oil and gas production. The country's total energy consumption in 2009 was about 15.7 million tons, which means that a significant part of its production is exported.

Controlling the western side of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan holds a crucial position between Central Asia and Europe. Azerbaijan produced 41.7 million tons of oil in 2007. Heavily dependent on the oil sector, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) was created to efficiently benefit from the abundance of hydrocarbon resources in the respective sector of the Caspian Sea. (Scalability as Drawn', *Azerbaijan 2012).*

The Shah Deniz Phase 2 project is expected to go into production in late 2018, and to start exporting to Europe in late 2019. In addition to Shah Deniz, there are several offshore Caspian fields and exploration prospects that could increase Azerbaijan's gas production in the 2020s. One field, Absheron, has been declared commercial under a PSA (with Total as operator, GDF Suez, and SOCAR); production is expected to start in 2021. SOCAR officials have projected an increase in production to 40–45 bcm of sales gas by 2025;[5] this assumes 9–14 bcm/year of gas from new offshore projects. We estimate that 3–8 bcm/year of additional gas could become available for export to Europe at some point in the 2020s.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

Holding the greatest share of Caspian oil in its national sector, Kazakhstan´s foreign policy is influenced by its dependence on Russian Federation as a primary energy

transit route. Additionally, the growing inflow of FDI from China signals the rising importance of cooperation with the east.

Uzbekistan is a major gas producer (50–60 bcm/year in recent years), and Kazakhstan an expanding one (about 12 bcm/year in recent years, likely to rise to 20–25 bcm/year in the 2020s). Most Uzbek and Kazakh gas is consumed domestically; small quantities (7–10 bcm/year from each) are exported to Russia; and both countries have concluded framework agreements, and some contracts, with China, providing for exports via the Turkmenistan–China pipeline, which started in 2013 from Uzbekistan. It is possible that Uzbek and Kazakh exports to Russia will fall in the 2020s, but there will be calls on this gas from China and from their domestic markets. *(Dekmejian, H.H.Simonian 2003).*

There are essentially just two viable way that Uzbek and Kazakh gas could reach the European market. Namely, Kazakh gas could be transported by pipeline across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and thence to Europe.

Via Russia, via existing pipelines, to European destinations. (Such sales were conducted, with the gas bought and resold by Gazprom and other Russian companies, from the mid 1990 s to 2009.) *(M.P.Croissant, B. Aras, 1999).*

Turkmenistan

The European Southern Corridor strategy, Turkmen gas could come from Trans-Caspian pipeline, envisioned to transfer Turkmeni gas to Azerbaijan via the Caspian sea, where it could easily connect to the pipelines heading for Europe. These plans also effectively bypass both Russian Federation and Islamic Republic of Iran, but their major are the bad relations between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan over the demarcation of the Caspian basin.

For Iran, a closer relationship with Turkmenistan promised useful oil swap agreements and access to the potentially lucrative Turkish natural gas market. The related further step of reaching Europe through Turkey would have put both Iran and Turkmenistan on the map as competitors to Gazprom. Iran considered, therefore, the 6 BCM Korpedzhe (on the Caspian shore of Turkmenistan) to Kurt-Kui line as a useful first step. The line was funded by Iran, with Turkmen debt to be repaid through gas deliveries. Still, the line had immediate advantages for Iran. A new domestic line linking gas fields in the south to the populous and industrial north-west would have cost far more than the Korpedzhe to Kurt-Kui pipeline. Since then Beijing has emerged as Turkmenistan's near monopolistic buyer-about 80 percent of Turkmen gas exports are now directed toward China. If the Turkmen authorities want to avoid total dependency on China, they will have to reopen discussion with Europe, but such a push does not appear likely to come either from Ashgabat or from Brussels in short term. I assume, that the only likely Central Asian source for significant gas exports to Europe is Turkmenistan. With only Turkmenistan contributing significantly to any gas transport towards the EU, additional gas from Azerbaijan will most likely have to ensure the necessary capacity utilization and economies of scale in order to make the EU's tapping of Caspian resources economically viable.

2. THE EU'S ENERGY IMPORT DEPENDENCY

In 2011, the EU-27 imported about 83 per cent of its crude oil, 64 per cent of natural gas and 47 per cent of its coal demand.[6] Fossil fuel projections towards 2030

indicate that gas demand is most likely to rise while oil consumption will stagnate at the current high level. So far, Russia is the EU's most important energy supplier. Russia's share of EU gas oil, and coal imports amount 34 per cent, 33 per cent and 26,2 per cent respectively. Norway and Libya, the EU's second and third largest supplier of oil, account for about 15 and 10 per cent of imports. In the field of gas, Norway and Algeria contribute 31 and 14 per cent to the EU's demand. Though EU energy imports are likely to further diversify as a consequence of increasing liquefied natural gas imports from Africa and Middle East, additional political steps towards diversification are necessary.

In the analysis on energy Import Dependency, which is made by European commission, *(OIES PAPER 2014),* we can see and make comparison, how it is increased from 1995 until 2014, it means that European Union seeks the way to diversify its energy demand.

Table 5 - Import Dependency-All Fuels- %

Import from extra EU	1995	2000	2005	2010	2013	2014
EU -28	43.1	46.7	52.2	52.6	53.1	53.5
Index 1995	100.0	108.3	121.1	122.2	123.3	124.1
Intra and Extra-EU imports						
BE	80.8	78.1	80.1	77.9	77.4	80.1
BG	55.9	46.0	46.7	39.6	37.7	34.5
CZ	20.6	22.9	28.0	25.6	27.9	30.4
DK	33.4	-35.0	-49.8	-15.7	13.3	12.8
DE	56.8	59.4	60.4	60.1	62.66	61.6
EE	32.3	32.2	26.1	13.6	11.9	8.9
IE	69.5	84.8	89.6	86.6	89.3	85.3
EL	66.7	69.5	68.6	69.2	62.2	66.2
ES	71.7	76.6	81.4	76.7	70.4	72.9
FR	48.0	51.5	51.6	49.1	48.0	46.1
HR	36.1	48.4	52.5	46.6	47.0	43.8
IT	81.9	86.5	83.4	82.6	76.8	75.9
CY	100.5	98.6	100.7	100.8	96.4	93.4
LV	70.4	61.0	63.9	45.5	55.8	40.6
LT	63.1	59.4	56.8	81.8	78.3	77.9
LU	97.7	99.6	97.4	97.1	97.0	96.6
HU	47.9	55.2	63.1	58.2	52.1	61.7
MT	104.8	100.3	100.1	99.0	104.1	97.7
NL	20.0	38.1	38.0	30.3	26.1	33.8
AT	66.4	65.4	71.6	62.8	61.6	65.9
PL	-1.2	9.9	17.2	31.3	25.6	28.6
PT	85.3	85.1	88.6	75.1	72.9	71.6
RO	30.3	21.8	27.6	21.9	18.5	17.0
SI	50.9	52.8	52.5	48.6	46.9	44.6

SK	68.5	65.6	65.3	63.1	59.2	60.9
FI	53.6	55.1	54.2	47.8	48.5	48.8
SE	38.9	40.7	36.8	36.6	31.6	32.1
UK	-16.4	-16.9	13.4	28.4	46.4	45.5

Source: EU Commission. EU energy in figures, statistical pocketbook 2016.

Table 6, shows gas demand scenarios for those countries which are – and are likely to continue to be – highly dependent on Russian gas (with an SCI exceeding 30) up to 2030.

	Gas demand in 2013	Russian gas imports in 2013	Gas demand projections			
Central European countries			2015	2020	2025	2030
Austria	8.53	4.79	8.53	7.54	7.60	7.11
Czech Republic	8.47	7.27	8.08	8.69	8.68	9.94
Slovakia	5.81	5.06	4.72	4.86	6.19	7.66
Poland	18.31	11.87	15.73	17.08	19.49	21.07
Hungary	9.28	5.52	10.65	11.12	10.37	9.79
Total	50.4	34.51	47.70	49.30	52.33	55.57
Baltic countries						
Estonia	0.68	0.64	0.34	0.38	0.41	0.43
Latvia	1.73	1.01	1.83	1.93	2.05	2.13
Lithuania	2.71	2.21	3.24	3.47	3.75	4.03
Finland	3.48	3.22	2.33	2.35	2.72	3.06
Total	8.6	7.08	7.74	8.13	8.92	9.65
South east European countries						
FYROM	0.16	0.09	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
Bosnia/Herzegovina	0.19	0.18	0.26	0.27	0.29	0.30
Bulgaria	2.59	2.67	2.89	3.03	3.14	3.29
Serbia	2.52	1.84	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30
Greece	3.84	2.39	4.32	4.10	3.85	3.64
Total	9.3	7.17	9.89	9.82	9.69	9.65
Grand Total	68.3	48.76	65.33	67.25	70.95	74.86

An important conclusion from those Table, is that for the three groups of countries which are highly dependent on Russian gas, demand is expected to increase by less than 7 bcm during the period 2013–2030: in Central Europe by 5.2 bcm, in the Baltic countries by 1.05 bcm, and in south-east Europe by 0.4 bcm. In 2030, total demand for gas in countries highly dependent on Russian gas in the Baltics and south-east Europe will be 19.3 bcm. In Central Europe, demand is much larger, particularly in Poland (which has significant domestic gas production and an SCI which is significantly lower than other countries in the region).

2.1. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF GAS SUPPLY TO EUROPE

In the early 1970s, European indigenous production covered most of the region's gas demand. By 2013, due to faster growth rates of consumption and a decline in gas production since the early 2000s, it only accounted for around 57 per cent of demand. European production is falling everywhere apart from Norway, and as a result, despite slow demand growth expected up to 2030, Europe will become sharply dependent on imports. Two countries represented 70 per cent of the indigenous production in 2013 – Norway: 109 bcm and the Netherlands: 86 bcm. These countries are also the two main sources of indigenous gas for the other European countries. Production from the UK continental shelf (UKCS) is still crucial, at about 38 bcm, but it only represents about half of the national needs. Another 19 countries produced gas in 2013; this was used by their national markets, except for Denmark which exported small quantities. Table above, shows scenarios for indigenous gas production in Europe for 2015, 2020, and 2030. Production is expected to decline from 282 bcm in 2013 to about 266 bcm in 2015, mostly due to the limit imposed on production from the Groningen field in the Netherlands. By 2020, indigenous production could decline by another 20 bcm as a result of sharper decline in the Netherlands, UK, and Germany. By 2030, European conventional gas production is expected to be about 172 bcm, a reduction of 110 bcm compared with 2013.[7] Table shows, that the total is deeply dependent on the three largest producers, which account for 82–84 per cent of the total throughout the period. Table 7 shows, indigenous conventional gas production in European markets 2013–2030 (bcm). (S. Pirani, S, 2012).

Country	2013	2015	2020	2030
Norway	109	109	110	100
UK	38	38	34	20
Netherlands	86	71	63	26
Other	49	48	39	27
TOTAL	282	266	246	172
Norway/UK/ Netherlands as a % of total	83	82	84	84

3. THE EU'S SOUTH EUROPEAN GAS CORRIDOR: OPTIONS FOR GAS SUPPLIES

The EU has been an active outside its borders in attempting to diversify its import supply routes and strengthen its ties with non-Russian suppliers in its neighborhood. This had led to a nascent 'energy diplomacy'. Already in 2008 the EU had announced a strategy to open up new gas import routes from Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East – a project known as the Southern Corridor. In June 2013, the Shah Deniz consortium and its leading stakeholders (the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), BP, Statoil, Total, Lukoil, NICO and TPAO, Turkey's national energy company) concluded negotiations that have lasted over a decade, approving the Trans-Adriatic

Pipeline (TAP) for the final leg of a pipeline bringing gas from the Shah Deniz field in the Caspian Sea to European markets. The consortium made a Final Investment Decision (FID) for stage 2 development of the Shah Deniz field, triggering plans to expand the South Caucasus Pipeline through Azerbaijan and Georgia, construct the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey and construct the TAP across Greece and Albania and into Italy. The first gas delivery to Europe (10 bcm/y) is scheduled for 2019 while plans to double this capacity are on the books. Another 6 bcm/y will go to Turkey. *(R. Kandiyoti, 2008).*

In order to diversify EU gas supply, and to provide Caspian suppliers with new export routes, several projects have been studied, re-evaluated, scrapped and resurfaced for the Southern Gas Corridor. The European Commission's declared objective remains to eventually supply 10% of European gas demand via an enhanced Southern Gas Corridor,[8] but the current scenario would see the Corridor initially supply about 2% or 3% of Europe's demand. This may seem minor, but the countries receiving the gas – from Bulgaria to Greece – are those that have the biggest energy security concerns due to reliance on Russian gas. With British petrol committing its Shah Deniz resources to the EU's Southern Gas Corridor 10 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas will eventually find its way to Europe by 2018.

The source diversification provided by the Southern Gas Corridor is not a panacea for European energy security but represents an important step in expanding Europe's energy frontiers towards the Caucasus and potential future partners in Iraq, Turkmenistan or Azerbaijan.

The Caspian and the Central Asian countries have a number of options to diversify their transport routes as well as export markets. While there is only the Turkmenistan–China pipeline to reach eastwards, three routes extend from Central Asia to the West: via the Caspian Sea, via Iran, and via Russia.

Nabucco-West vs.TAP: After years of fierce competition among Europe's energy giants, the developers of a major Azerbaijani natural gas field in the Caspian Sea recently picked the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) project over the Nabucco West project to transport Caspian natural gas to Europe. According to the estimated cost of the project is around $5 billion. (S. Pirani, S, 2012). If constructed, TAP, developed by Norway's Statoil, Switzerland's EGL and Germany's E.ON, will ship 10 bcm of gas per year, with the option to increase the capacity up to 20 bcm. It will run through Greece and Albania, under the Adriatic Sea to southern Italy. The construction of TAP would provide the countries involved in this project, such as Greece and Albania, with a large inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and foster economic growth. West is the shortened form of the "Nabucco" put forward a few years ago. "Nabucco", one branch of which started from Georgian-Turkish border and was more than 3 thousand km in length, was planned for the transportation of 31 billion m^3 of gas from Central Asia, South Caucuses and Middle East regions. The geopolitical situation in the above-mentioned regions, and the absence of export routes from these regions Europe put the realization of that project under question. (R. Kandiyoti, 2008). Considering the gains accruing to Azerbaijan and Continental Europe from TAP and Nabucco-West would favor TAP over Nabucco-West in 2013. TAP is based on a 2013 intergovernmental agreement between Albania, Italy and Greece. The advantage of the TAP project is that it links the Caspian Sea and Turkey on one side and the European market on the other. Apart from its main route to Italy,

which is the biggest European gas market after Germany, interconnectors can be built to Bulgaria from Greece, as well as a new pipeline to Montenegro and Croatia along the Adriatic coast from the tie-in in Albania, the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP).

Via the Caspian Sea (TCP). TCP carries Central Asian gas via an offshore pipeline under the Caspian Sea to its western coast, and from there the Southern Corridor (TANAP and TAP) delivers the gas to the Turkish and European markets. Turkmenistan benefits by 0.5 bn € since TCP bypasses the current transit countries, i.e., Russia and Iran, and introduces a new transport route for westbound Central Asian gas. Turkmenistan's spare production capacity is enough to fill up the offshore pipeline's capacity. Turkey enjoys supply competition in its market as well as it strains it position on the route (0.bn €). However, Azerbaijan benefits from Turkmenistan's access to its export markets (0.5bn €) since it is the transit country on the route and controls Turkmenistan's access to the Southern Corridor. Although the EC supports TCP, Turkmen gas via TCP returns the European players (the Balkans, Continental Europe and UK) only 0.3bn €due to the transit countries on the route, and the European companies show little interest in the project. Costing 0.5bn€,[9] is strategically viable for the non-European countries Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Turkey (1.5bn € in total). However, continuing opposition from Russia and Iran currently appears likely to prevent any submarine gas pipeline across the Caspian from moving beyond a hypothesis.[10]

Via Iran (TTP) Linking Turkmenistan via Iran to the Southern Corridor. Turkmenistan benefits 0.3bn €. Again, the transit countries, in this case Turkey and Iran, collect most of the gains from the project. While Turkey enjoys supply competition in its market, Iran benefits from better access to the markets. TTP affects the rest of the players in an analogous manner to TCP. In the nearest time, Turkmenistan intends to initiate gas extraction in the world's second gas field Galkynysh, whose reserves are evaluated from 13.1 to 21.2 tcm of natural gas. In view of starting the development of such giant gas field, Ashkhabad is concerned about seeking new exports routes. *(L.Maruelle, J. Mankoff, 2016).* Iran has the world's biggest proven gas reserves, and Turkmenistan is ranked number four globally in terms of gas reserves. Together, the two neighboring countries, located in the richest swathe of land in the world in terms of energy resources, between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, have some 25% of the world's gas. With the European Union and the United States lifting sanctions against Iran on 16thJanuary 2016, the EU will gain access to a second major gas market in the world, beside Russia, and combined with the soaring LNG imports envisaged in the next few years, the EU's Energy Union's strategic goal to diversify Europe's energy supply could be reached. After raising sanctions and normalizing the Tehran-US relationships and the extension of the new gas pipeline presently, supplying gas only to Iran as far as Turkey and further on to Europe could become soon reality.

Via Russia: from South Stream to Turkish Stream. The south stream project is Russia's response to Nabucco. It was first launched in June 2007 when the Italian energy company Eni and Gazprom of Russia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) which push the construction of 900 km submarine pipeline from Druzhba on the Russian Black sea coast to the Bulgarian city of Varna. In Bulgaria, the pipeline will divide into two. The southern side will run through Greece and under the Ionic sea to Italy, while the northwestern part will run through Serbia and Hungary to the Baumgarten gas hub in Austria. On December 1, 2014, following a meeting between the Russian and Turkish

presidents, president Putin and Gazprom CEO A. Miller announced that South Stream had been cancelled. The South Stream cancellation was accompanied by a Russian announcement that it would be replaced with pipelines of the same capacity to deliver gas across the Black Sea directly to Turkey. Of the 63 bcm/year of capacity, 14 bcm/year would replace the volume currently delivered to Turkey via Ukraine and the trans-Balkan pipeline, while the part (approximately 50 bcm/year) would be delivered to the Turkish-Greek border where Gazprom would set up a natural gas "hub" for Southern European customers.[11] Turkish Stream proposals – both of which would create a new route in bringing (the same) Russian gas to Europe. For the EU, the energy security benefits of South Stream and Turkish Stream involving avoiding gas transit through Ukraine. Both routes diversify supply routes although not supply sources.

Russians officials have stated that if the negotiations progress, gas could be delivered by the end of 2018. Turkish authorities, on the other hand, expect the project to continue for at least two and half years.

CONCLUSION

The five Caspian littoral states differ in terms of size, power projection capabilities and wealth in on- and offshore natural resources. The two main Caspian littoral powers are Russia and Iran, both endowed with huge natural gas and oil resources on shore, and both not very well endowed with natural gas resources offshore in the Caspian sea. The other three Caspian littoral states lack power projection capabilities, lack a diverse export market for natural resources (especially Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan). As such, the vision of importing large quantities of natural gas or oil from the eastern side of the Caspian (Central Asia) to the Western side of the Caspian (Europe), is a task and will require a shift in EU foreign policy or alliances vis a vis third countries. The EU's energy security policy revolved around primarily two objectives: integration and diversification. The former of these meant expanding the internal EU market structures, this way also including external actors. This focus on transparent market rules and networks would strengthen Brussels, as it would increase access and availability of energy resources to the EU. Moreover, by interlinking energy infrastructure the Union would become more resilient to possible supply disruptions. In terms of the EU's diversification efforts, these were mainly related to attempts to establish new routes, seek to include new energy suppliers and finally to promote different energy types. All these three factors can be seen as having the same fundament in the EU energy thinking; as too large dependence on any one of these would constitute an energy security risk. Caspian basin and Central Asian countries played a role in both of the EU concerns. The EU-Caspian energy structure could become a counterweight to Russia.

As things stand now, the geographical limits dictate three possible or already realized options of shipping Eastern Caspian energy resources to the Western Caspian. The first one is a legacy of the Soviet Union: Central Asian and Caspian energy resources being shipped through Russian territory and pipelines, to Europe. This is the status quo. The second option is to build trans-Caspian pipelines, pipelines for the transport of gas and oil, from the Eastern sea beds of the Caspian, to the Western sea beds of the Caspian, to ship the onwards to Europe. Thirdly, the 'southern route', piping Eastern Caspian natural gas and oil through over land pipelines, via Iran, to Turkey and onwards

to Europe. All three options have pitfalls, drawbacks and rewards. In this conclusion, I will focus on the 'path of least resistance'.

As mentioned above the EU policy push towards supply diversification is to lessen the dependence and power of Russia. Chiefly because of that reason, the first option (piping more Caspian and Central Asian energy to Europe through Russia) is not plausible and not a viable option. The second option, building under sea pipelines, cutting through the Caspian Sea, from East to West, has great challenges of a different nature. The biggest problem with this option, is the tandem opposition of Russia and Iran. Would be deprived of a very large potential future market, the EU. Russia would not only be deprived of a 'potential future market', but it would also undermine current gas delivery volumes.

The third and final option is the southern route, piping the energy overland, from the Eastern Caspian, through Iran, to Turkey and onwards to the EU. This is the path of least resistance.

There are already pipelines between Turkmenistan and Iran and between Iran and Turkey. Although those pipelines don't have nearly enough capacity, parallel lines can be built. Routing through Iran solves two crucial problems. Firstly, it lessens dependence on Russian energy supplies. As such, it gives the captive Turkmen and Kazakh export markets a big breather. Their oil and gas can even be sold through the Persian Gulf ports. Secondly, it solves the insurmountable problem of double/tandem Russian-Iranian opposition to Caspian Sea pipelines.

The EU has enough power to deal with Iran (mostly economically), but less with Russia. Iran has a population of 80 million and cultural, historical links to the other Caspian littoral nations. Also, it give those small countries a viable alternative vis a vis Russia, in order to balance their foreign relations. As such, this EU policy, if executed well, could two birds with one stone: not only lessen dependence on Russian gas/oil (transit), but also to lessen Russia's influence in the littoral nations. That will force Russia to negotiate better prices in the future. As a side-bonus: Iran would be invested in behaving itself in the region and even in the middle east. Because being a reliable transit country for the first few years, would make EU policy heads open toward purchasing large quantities of Iranian gas, running along parallel lines, in the future. If executed well, this solution will catch three birds with one stone for the EU.

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Каспий өңірінің энергетикалық ресурстары және олардың Еуро Одақ энергетикалық қауіпсіздігіне әсері

Аннотация: Энергетикалық қауіпсіздік соңғы жылдары Еуропалық Одақтың сыртқы саясатының іргетастарының бірі ретінде пайда болды. ЕО мұнай мен газ импортына өте тәуелді, оның 35 пайызы Ресейден келеді. Осылайша, энергия көздерін әртараптандыру ЕО үшін басты мақсат болып табылады. Каспий аймағы әлемдегі ең ірі игерілмеген мұнай мен газ қорларын қамтиды. Ірі халықаралық мұнай-газ компанияларының жоғары қызығушылық танытуы оның болашақта ірі мұнай жеткізушісі бола алатынын көрсетеді. Аймақтың ресурстарын игеруде әлі де кедергілер бар. Оларға экспорттық құбырлардың жоқтығы және жаңа құбырлар бойынша

ұсыныстардың көпшілігі жеткізу қауіпсіздігі мәселелеріне, транзиттік қиындықтарға, саяси және құқықтық мәселелерге және нарықтағы белгісіздікке байланысты қиындықтарға тап болуы жатады. Сондай-ақ ресурстарды иеленуге, сондай-ақ толық емес және жиі қарама-қайшы инвестициялық режимдерге қатысты сұрақтар бар. Бұл зерттеу бұрынғы Кеңес Одағының оңтүстік шетіндегі маңызды мұнай және газ ресурстарына ие елдерге назар аударады: Орталық Азиядағы Қазақстан, Түркіменстан және Өзбекстан және Закавказьедегі Әзірбайжан. Мұнай мен газды тасымалдау және нарық мәселелерін талқылауда көршілес бірнеше мемлекеттер де қамтылған. Каспий бассейнін және ықтимал Таяу Шығыстағы газды Еуропаға жеткізуді байланыстыруға бағытталған Оңтүстік энергетикалық дәліз (ӘКК) ЕО-ның энергетикалық инфрақұрылымының алты басымдылық осінің бірі болып табылады. Мақалада ЕО-ның Қара теңіз кеңістігіндегі энергетикалық қауіпсіздігін арттыруға бағытталған күш-жігеріне талдау жасалған.

Кілтті сөздер: Каспий елдері, Еуро Одақ, көмірсутектер, оңтүстік дәліз, құбыр, энергетикалық қауіпсіздік

Энергетические ресурсы каспийского региона и их влияние на энергетическую безопасность Европейского Союза

Аннотация: В последние годы энергетическая безопасность стала одним из краеугольных камней внешней политики Европейского Союза. ЕС сильно зависит от импорта нефти и газа, 35% которых поступает из России. Таким образом, диверсификация поставок энергии является ключевой целью для ЕС. Каспийский регион содержит одни из крупнейших в мире неосвоенных запасов нефти и газа. Большой интерес, проявленный крупными международными нефтегазовыми компаниями, свидетельствует о его потенциале, в будущем он может стать крупным поставщиком нефти. Освоение ресурсов региона по-прежнему сталкивается с препятствиями. К ним относятся отсутствие экспортных трубопроводов и тот факт, что большинство предложений по новым трубопроводам сталкиваются с трудностями из-за соображений безопасности поставок, сложностей с транзитом, политических и правовых соображений и рыночной неопределенности. Есть также вопросы, касающиеся собственности на ресурсы, а также неполные и часто противоречивые инвестиционные режимы. Это исследование сосредоточено на странах южной окраины бывшего Советского Союза, обладающих значительными запасами нефти и газа: Казахстане, Туркменистане и Узбекистане в Центральной Азии и Азербайджане в Закавказье. Несколько соседних государств также участвуют в дискуссиях о транспортировке нефти и газа и рынках. Южный энергетический коридор (SEC), который призван соединить Каспийский бассейн и, возможно, поставки газа с Ближнего Востока в Европу, является одним из шести приоритетных направлений энергетической инфраструктуры ЕС. В статье представлен анализ усилий ЕС в более широком черноморском регионе по повышению его энергетической безопасности.

Ключевые слова: Каспийские страны, Евро Союз, углеводороды, южный коридор, трубопровод, энергетическая безопасность

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RESOURCE NATIONALISM AS KEYSTONE FACTOR IN KAZAKHSTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

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Abstract. This article seeks to identify country-specific peculiarities of the factors affecting foreign policy formation in petro-states taking the case of Kazakhstan including domestic ones as society and state institutions, as well as external factors containing policy of great powers, transnational organisations and international system etc. Energy factor being a key geopolitical motivation for many powers located even far outside the neighborhood urges Kazakhstan to continuously lineup its foreign policy strategy in accordance with contemporary conjuncture in the market.

Key words: Kazakhstan's foreign policy, resource nationalism, energy factor, policy revision.

INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy formation is reported to be dependent on various factors such as the size of territory, geographical position, level and nature of economic development, socio-cultural and historical legacy, governmental culture and structure.

However, it is worth noting that territorial size of a country influences the psychological and operational environment within which the foreign policy-makers and public respond. It includes, as Rosenau says, both human and non-human resources. Nations with large human and non-human (natural) resources always try to be big powers and they have better chances of becoming big powers in international relations.

Being relatively most permanent and stable factor of its foreign policy, geography of a state determines both the needs as well as the capability to fulfill the needs of the people of a nation. Suitable geographical factors and availability of natural resources can help and encourage the nation to adopt and pursue higher goals. *(Rietveld M., Toledano P. 2017).*

Since the end of communism, Kazakhstan has consistently pursued 'multivector foreign policy' that emphasizes maintaining good relations with Russia while also courting the interest of other great powers. In the 1990s, this policy focused on developing relations with the US and Western Europe. Today it extends to include growing worldwide interest in Kazakhstan. It emerged as an independent state with neither the political institutions nor the staff needed to guarantee basic state's functions. The country had few diplomats, and its diplomatic representation was initially handled almost entirely by Russian embassies. In 1992, 1993 and 1994, President Nazarbayev signed major agreements with Russia, China and the US. While Russia came first, Kazakhstan made a concerted effort to reach out to China and the US in order to achieve balance in its foreign policy. This early expression of multilateralism developed into the multivector approach, which was enshrined as the core doctrine of Kazakh foreign policy

and incorporated into Nazarbayev's Kazakhstan 2030 strategy. *(Н.А. Назарбаев. Июль 2007).*

DISCUSSION

The multi-vector policy was then, and remains to this day, a key driver of the international component of Kazakhstan's energy policy.

Under difficult conditions between 1992 and 1997 the Kazakh elite signed agreements with TOCs to exploit certain large oil fields (Tengiz, Karachaganak), to explore those with the greatest potential (Caspian Sea), and to build transport routes from aforementioned fields to foreign markets.

This was the groundwork that led Kazakhstan to become (from 1998 to 2000) a new international oil actor. Commencement of drilling in Karachaganak and Tengiz prompted a rapid increase in overall oil production, while the opening of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) allowed much of that oil to flow for export. During this time, two happy coincidences arose that helped to change expectations about Kazakhstan oil potential: international oil prices began to spike (from $13 per barrel in 1998 to over $28.5 in 2000).

As the economic situation improved, increasing oil export revenues strengthened the ruling elite. Oil revenues rose from $6 billion to $41.5 billion between 2000 and 2007, making possible GDP growth at an average rate of 10% annually. These economic results gave more credit to government policies and fed Nazarbayev's "modernizing" propaganda. In turn, oil sales favored the extension of rent-seeking through budgetary activity.

Public revenues and expenditures rose rapidly, and the government proved willing to share these rents with local and regional leaders. In addition, a growing share of public expenditures (up from $4 billion to $25 billion between 1999 and 2007) was earmarked for social services, housing, and transportation, as well as for fostering public employment. This extended network of territorial and social clientelism, very much favored by the country's small population, at 15.5 million, increased the power stability. At the same time, the population felt the benefits of the oil boom through other channels, as export growth enabled increased imports of consumer goods. *(Daly, J., 2008).*

On the one hand, the Kazakh government's capacity for policy implementation has increased steadily since independence and was arguably at its greatest under the government of Prime Minister Karim Massimov. On the other hand, as government professionalism has increased, international oil companies have faced escalating pressure on their terms in increasingly sophisticated ways. It is important to build long-run international investors' confidence which can be done by protecting and safeguarding their interests against risk and uncertainty stemming from the oil market and by reducing their stock market's oil dependency.

As oil prices rose from the end of the 1990s, the government became gradually more assertive, most notably in 2002 when it alleged environmental damages at Chevron's Tengiz field. This resource nationalism came to its peak in 2007 when the Kazakh government accused the consortium developing the massive Kashagan field of failing to meet their obligations under the production sharing agreement (PSA) and threatened to nationalize the project. When it was initially drilled in 2000, Kashagan, the biggest oil field discovered worldwide in more than 20 years, was hailed as an

unprecedented find that would revitalise interest in the Caspian and produce oil as early as 2005. While project delays and cost overruns have been endemic in the oil industry, Kashagan is, in the view of the International Energy Agency (IEA), a truly exceptional case, delaying roughly five times the aggregate oil volume of the next largest delay surveyed by the IEA. More importantly, the general global trend of cost overruns and project delays does not reduce the immediate pain the Kashagan delay has caused Kazakhstan. *(Gorst, I. & Crooks E. Financial times, July. 2007).*

Kazakh resource nationalism is best understood as essentially economic in character. The aim has been to improve economic terms and long-term economic benefit for the country. Kazakhstan has done this in three ways: first, by increasing the state share of ownership in major projects; second, by placing more of the burden of cost overruns and delays on the international oil companies; and third, by increasing the state's control of the project through Kaz Munai Gaz company (KMG).

Resource revenues are a source of public funds and, as is widely recommended, these can be used to fund public investments complementary to private investment, such as investment in human capital, in public infrastructure, and possibly also in utilities. *(Parra, F. 2004).*

At length, Kazakhstan arrived at a new economic and oil scenario, where the consolidation of the political elite and the opportunities offered by Russian and Chinese oil interest enabled Kazakhstan to propose new objectives. The weakness of the Kazakh government during the nineties did not prevent it from trying to revise oil contracts *(Olcott, M., 2007).*, but under the new scenario government goals became more ambitious, and qualitatively different. The new objectives were to develop a policy specifically oriented toward revision of oil agreements with TOCs, to strengthen national share in the oil sector, enhancing the role of KazMunaiGas (KMG) as a stakeholder, and to obtain greater income from production and oil exports. (Campaner, N., Yenikeyeff, S., 2008).

Renegotiation of oil agreements. The government's attitude began to change in 2002, when Chevron was accused of environmental crimes. This set off increasing tensions in the major fields, some of which have given rise to intense conflicts that are motivated by three main issues.

Compliance with environmental legislation. Chevron agreed to pay a fine of $600 million, followed by another fine in 2007 for ignoring rules on sulfur storage. Another environmental conflict in 2005 with Canada's Hurricane led to that company's decision to sell Petro Kazakhstan, which was later acquired by China's CNPC.

The continuous amendment of tax laws. The new code adopted in 2004 altered the tax regimes of both Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) contracts and the Excess Profit Tax. At the same time, the government has introduced new taxes on natural resource exploitation and oil exports, with subsequent revisions that left open the option of applying the general tax regime to PSA contracts that had been initially exempt. Moreover, oil companies are now forced to fund social programs and other bonuses to local communities, beyond previous agreements.

Forcing the entry of the national company (KMG) into private oil projects. In 2004, a law was passed on PSA agreements which replaced the 1995 law and stated that KMG would thereafter take a 50% stake in future consortia.

Moreover, demands for goods and services by these consortia were to meet a minimum of local content. A year later, when British Gas (BG) decided to sell its share (16.7%) in Kashagan, the government claimed that KMG should obtain this quota, thereby ignoring the right of partners to first refusal, accorded by the contract. After a period of negotiation, agreement was reached on the purchase of 8.3% by KMG, with the other companies in the consortium permitted to buy the remaining 8.3%. But the controversy gained new force when in 2007 the leader of the consortium, Agip, announced that oil drilling in Kashagan would be again delayed due to technical difficulties. *(Jeffrey, D., Ossowski, R., Fedelino, A., 2003).*

After rejecting Agip's explanation, the Kazakh government demanded a payment to compensate the country for the negative effects of this new delay, also proposing to increase KMG's share in the consortium. After several months in which Kashagan activities remained stalled, an agreement was reached in January 2008 that included the main government demands. Above all, parties accepted a leading role in the consortium for KMG, which share rose to 16.81% (for an additional $1.8 billion), or just slightly above the shares held by the largest original partners: Agip, ExxonMobil, Shell, and Total (16.66%). Meanwhile, ConocoPhillips and Inpex reduced their shares to 8.28%. *(Philip, D., Keen, M., McPherson, Ch, 2010).*

Thus, the revision of TOC agreements has led to ensuring the primacy of Kazakh law, increasing government oil revenues and enhancing KMG's role as a player in Kashagan and other fields. This has called into question two basic principles that had initially attracted Western investors: property rights and the stability of the tax regime. The irony was that the bargaining position of said investors was now much weaker, merely because they were the owners of very high-value specific assets that had been invested in Kazakhstan in the 1990s.

Enhancing methods to collect oil rents to develop the rentier economy. The new government bargaining position and the reorganization of the national sector have expanded the state's capacity to collect oil revenues. On one side, royalties and other fees were replaced in 2008 by the Mineral Extraction Tax (MET) that taxes both domestic and foreign production by from 5% to 18% (in different steps ranging from 5,000 to more than 100,000 b/d). In turn, the VAT levies domestic transactions at a uniform 12%, while export duties have been converted (since 2008) into a tax ranging between 7% and 32% that becomes effective when international prices rise above $50/barrel. Finally, companies must pay a small fee for employees' social security, while the profit tax has fallen in recent years from 30% to 20%. To all these contributions must be added fines, bonuses, and advance payments from foreign companies.

It is difficult to measure the impact of the tax burden on businesses, since fiscal measures undergo continuous changes both in tax rates and in which companies are subject to tax payment. *(Angelier, J.-P., 2008).*

Often a general provision is followed by bilateral negotiations between the government and each company, giving rise to specific and diverse agreements and making the tax act discretionary. The information provided by government and businesses does not allow analysis of the tax impact on foreign companies. However, there is evidence that these obligations are not overly burdensome to TOCs, even despite late changes, as it is estimated that national actors (government, KMG, and local communities) will receive 60% and TOCs 40% of long-run cumulative profits from

Karachaganak and Kashagan. This means that the Kazakh share will be significantly lower than in Middle Eastern and European countries. For example, the Norwegian ratio is 80%–20%.

It is easier to assess the impact of oil taxes on the state budget [4,5]. Public revenues from the oil sector rose from 2.2% of GDP in 1999 to 12,7% in 2015, and from 18% to 44% of the state budget. (Kalyuzhnova, Y., 2006).

In developing its oil and gas resources, Kazakhstan has had two key goals: avoiding reliance on Russia and ensuring that economic growth delivers tangible benefits to the growing middle class. In order for Kazakhstan to pursue an independent foreign policy that allowed it to balance Russian influence with the interest of other powers and to maximise its return on its oil and gas resources, Kazakhstan needed to ensure that it was not exclusively dependent on Russia for the key strategic oil and gas sector of its economy. In addition to its obvious concern to avoid extending Soviet-era reliance on Moscow by encouraging international investment and developing international political alliances, Kazakhstan is landlocked, leaving it reliant on international pipelines to reach international markets. In 2004, while Azerbaijan was completing the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, which gave it access to international markets without transiting Russia, Kazakhstan relied on Soviet-era pipelines and the new CPC pipeline that connected the Tengiz field with the Russian port of Novorossiisk. President Nazarbayev's strategy for Kazakhstan has been based on using natural resource wealth to fund improvements in standards of living, economic competitiveness, infrastructure and the functioning of government institutions.

THE RESULTS

These twin goals of economic independence and development have driven Kazakhstan to encourage international competition both to produce and to export its oil and gas. In the first place, competition to produce oil and gas enables the Kazakh government to maximise its share of revenue and to force firms into adopting strict local content policies, which are seen to benefit economic development. In the second place, competition for exports ensures that, although Kazakhstan is landlocked, it is not forced by lack of substantial alternative export options to take a below-market price for its oil.

The focus on the energy sector as a springboard for Kazakhstan's economic development is particularly clear in value-added activities like equipment manufacture, financing and refining. Although these activities usually occur outside the borders of Kazakhstan, the government and its state companies are attempting to expand domestic activity and acquire equity participation in value-added activities abroad. This can be seen through local content requirement, the policy of establishing International Financial Centre in Astana, and the emphasis of KMG taking a leading role in future projects.

In addition to expanding its activities throughout the value chain, the Kazakh government appears to want domestic firms, most notably KMG, to take an active technical role in most energy projects to develop local expertise, similar to Saudi Arabia's prescription for 'participation, not nationalisation' in the late 1960s and 1970s.

CONCLUSION

This is shown in the policy of reserving new operatorships for Kazakh companies, while leaving open the option of foreign companies jointly participating with the Kazakh

operator. This approach may be designed to help KMG gain the necessary technical and project-management capability to work in the shallow water Kazakh zone of the Caspian to develop future projects. As such, this approach is consistent with Kazakhstan's policy of economic resource nationalism, as the goal is to capture a larger share of the value of its energy production.

However, this pressure on international oil companies was driven by primarily economic concerns enabling Kazakhstan's state companies to take a larger share in the industry. These changes did not represent a rejection of the multi-vector foreign policy that originally led Kazakhstan to welcome Western investment, but rather a rebalancing of the fiscal terms in view of oil prices and rising project costs.

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Ресурстық ұлтшылдық Қазақстанның сыртқы саясатының негізгі факторы ретінде

Аннотация. Бұл мақала Қазақстанды, оның ішінде қоғам мен мемлекеттік институттар ретіндегі ішкі факторларды, сондай-ақ ұлы державалардың, трансұлттық ұйымдардың және халықаралық жүйенің саясатын қамтитын сыртқы факторларды ескере отырып, мұнай-

мемлекеттердің сыртқы саясатын қалыптастыруға әсер ететін факторлардың елге тән ерекшеліктерін анықтауға бағытталған. т.б. Энергия факторы көршілес аймақтан алыс орналасқан көптеген державалар үшін негізгі геосаяси мотивация бола отырып, Қазақстанды сыртқы саяси стратегиясын нарықтағы заманауи конъюнктураға сәйкес үздіксіз құруға шақырады.

Кілтті сөздер: Қазақстанның сыртқы саясаты, ресурстық ұлтшылдық, энергетикалық фактор, саясатты қайта қарау.

Ресурсный национализм как ключевой фактор внешней политики Казахстана

Абстрактный. В данной статье ставится задача выявить страновые особенности факторов, влияющих на формирование внешней политики нефтегосударств на примере Казахстана, в том числе внутренних как общества и государственных институтов, а также внешних факторов, содержащих политику великих держав, транснациональных организаций и международной системы. и др. Энергетический фактор, являющийся ключевым геополитическим мотивом для многих держав, находящихся даже далеко за пределами соседства, побуждает Казахстан постоянно выстраивать свою внешнеполитическую стратегию в соответствии с современной конъюнктурой рынка.
Ключевые слова: Внешняя политика Казахстана, ресурсный национализм, энергетический фактор, пересмотр политики.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL COOPERATION OF THE NEW TURKIC COUNTRIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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Abstract. New Turkic countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) make a significant contribution to the development of the Eurasian space, so there is every reason to study in depth the heritage of the Turkic world, their role and place in modern international relations.

Key words: Turk world, geo-policy, Central Asia, international organization, security.

INTRODUCTION

The creation of a regional Turkic geopolitical bloc is still relevant. Alone, it is difficult for the Turkic States to become a subject of modern geopolitics and geostrategy.

In the history of the independent period of the three Turkic States of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – there was an experience of regional cooperation in the military and political sphere. It should be noted that as early as January 1994, the leaders of three Central Asian States (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) signed an Agreement on the formation of the Central Asian Union (CAC), the goals of which were to create an economic space and ensure the security of the countries of this region. In the CAC in the first half of the 1990s, the main focus was on solving economic problems, although this Union was essentially a geo-economic and geopolitical system, characterized as a condition for increasing the security resource of integration subjects. And according to the Agreement on the establishment of the CAC organization (2002), these same States were to provide mutual support to each other in preventing the threat of independence, combating transnational crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and illegal migration, as well as cooperate on the creation of common transport and energy infrastructures, and conduct a coordinated policy in the field of border and customs control.

Three fraternal States-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan-took part in military cooperation and peace-keeping measures, including joint security of the Afghan-Tajik border with Russia and the creation of a Central Asian battalion. However, at the present stage, the integration of the Turkic countries of Central Asia, including the military and political ones, has encountered difficulties, objective and subjective. Some researchers suggest that States participating in integration processes do not define regional relations as priority due to the lack of objective prerequisites. (Саидазимова Г. 2006).

In short, in the global economic and political space, the Central Asian States do not act collectively, but rather autonomously and on an individual basis. (Алшанов Р., Ашимбаева А. 2011).

In these circumstances, the Turkic countries of the Central Asian region prefer to participate in international regional organizations with the participation of powers with more powerful potential, and an important role is assigned to the military-political aspect of cooperation. The fight against terrorism, political and religious extremism, transnational organized crime and other threats to stability and security is at the heart of the foreign policy of the Central Asian States.

DISCUSSION

As we know, the decision of the Council of foreign Ministers of the CSCE member States on January 31, 1992 to join the CSCE along with Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Tajikistan, as well as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan marked the beginning of cooperation between the new Turkic States of Central Asia and Transcaucasia with the CSCE/OSCE. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the following stages of cooperation between Central Asian countries and the CSCE/OSCE are highlighted:

- 1992-1995 - establishment of cooperation in the regional context (the 1st stage of the evolution of relations between the Central Asian countries and the CSCE was largely tentative and introductory);
- 1996-2001-the OSCE is beginning to understand the strategic importance and value of the region, which is reflected in the opening of the Organization's" field presences " (i.e., representative offices) in each Central Asian Republic;
- 2001-2004 – the "war on terror" and the growing contradictions between Central Asia and the OSCE. (Боконбаева Ж.К. 2011).

In 2004, the Central Asian countries and the OSCE adopted the "Appeal of the CIS member States to OSCE partners". The address addresses the problems of OSCE reform in the following areas:

- strengthening the anti-terrorist direction in the functioning of the Organization;
- settlement of regional conflicts throughout the OSCE area;
- further improvement of the military-political, as well as full-fledged development of the environmental and economic dimension of the OSCE;
- a more balanced work of the OSCE in the humanitarian sphere, including the introduction by the ODIHR (Office for democratic institutions and human rights) and OSCE missions of common objective criteria for evaluating electoral processes throughout the OSCE area.

It is no secret that at the beginning of the new Millennium, relations between the OSCE and Tashkent deteriorated due to human rights violations in Uzbekistan. But at the same time, the next and long-awaited OSCE summit was decided to be held in Kazakhstan, which once again confirmed the trust of this authoritative organization to the new independent States.

From the CIS countries, the Republic of Kazakhstan managed to achieve a high level of relations with the OSCE. In 2003, Kazakhstan made a statement of its intention to run for the OSCE Chairmanship, which was supported by the CIS member States. In

November 2007, the Council of foreign Ministers of the OSCE participating States decided to grant Kazakhstan the post of OSCE Chairman in 2010.

In 2008, a separate Permanent mission of Kazakhstan to the OSCE was opened, and this decision was dictated by the tasks of preparing and holding the chairmanship of Kazakhstan in the organization in 2010. This was the logical conclusion of a large and productive work of the state and recognition of the country's real achievements in building a democratic society with a liberal market economy. (Шаймуханова С.Д.2013).

During its presidency, the Republic of Kazakhstan put forward a military-political initiative to move from the concept of "security space" to the concept of"security community". In this vector, the OSCE activities under the chairmanship of Kazakhstan were aimed at resolving protracted conflicts. Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the OSCE has become a significant event in Kazakhstan's foreign policy, which it has undoubtedly used to assert itself as a regional leader, increase the country's international weight and improve the foreign policy position of the organization itself.

In 1992, the Republic of Azerbaijan joined the OSCE Helsinki Final Act, in 1993-the Paris Charter, and in 1999-the Charter of European Security, which are the main documents of the organization. It is clear that Azerbaijan is cooperating with the OSCE on the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in the field of democratization.

Turkmenistan joined the Final Helsinki act of 1975 in 1992. The OSCE center in Ashgabat operates in three main dimensions: military-political, economic-environmental, and humanitarian. Projects are also being implemented in the areas of security, combating organized crime and drug trafficking, and strengthening and managing borders.

By a decision of the OSCE Permanent Council of 23 July 1998, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) was given broad responsibilities for implementing cooperation with the Kyrgyz Republic across the entire spectrum of mutual interests. According to the mandate of the OSCE Center in Bishkek, activities in the field of political and military cooperation are concentrated in three key areas: the development of political institutions, conflict prevention and the fight against terrorism. (Шаймуханова С.Д. 2015).

The accession of the Turkic States of the post-Soviet space to the OSCE membership has contributed to the formation of common principles of coexistence with European countries and the development of domestic and foreign policy. But at the same time, the role of other international and regional organizations in the multilateral diplomacy of the Turkic States is noticeably growing.

Relations between the Turkic countries of the post-Soviet space and the NATO bloc began immediately after these States gained independence. In the early 1990s, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan became members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (renamed the Euro - Atlantic partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997). The EAPC, as a multilateral mechanism, allows the Turkic countries to carry out a dialogue with the NATO member countries and the countries of the Eurasian space on the most pressing issues of international security. Participation in the annual Meetings of the EAPC foreign and defense Ministers is an important component of cooperation. All Turkic countries of the former Soviet Union joined the Partnership for peace (PFP) program in 1994.

As M. Starchak notes, with the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, Central Asia became a region of interest for the North Atlantic Alliance.

The US and its NATO allies have requested and received support for their operation in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan has leased Manas airport. Uzbekistan also granted the right to fly over its territory and transit for the transport of NATO members ' personnel and supplies.

The Turkic countries of the former Soviet Union joined the NATO program "PFP planning and analysis Process" (Azerbaijan in 1997, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan in 2002, Kyrgyzstan in 2007). In 1996, Tashkent and NATO approved the first individual partnership Program (PIP), which allowed Uzbekistan to develop cooperation with the Alliance on a substantive basis. Since 2006, the Republic of Kazakhstan has also started cooperation with NATO within the framework of the Individual action plan of the partnership between Kazakhstan and NATO. The set of measures outlined in the programs cover the areas of training and equipping individual units of the Kazbat Armed forces according to NATO standards, training a special rescue team capable of taking part in international rescue and humanitarian operations, cooperation in border security, reforming the Armed Forces, as well as emergency civil plan In June 2009, NATO held a security Forum in Astana, which demonstrates the importance of Kazakhstan in the strategy of cooperation with post-Soviet countries. The Forum was attended by delegations from 50 EAPC and NATO countries and other countries. The Forum discussed security issues in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the situation in Afghanistan, and energy security issues.

In contrast to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan began to build armed forces on the model of NATO countries, i.e. military units were re-formed on the NATO model. However, Uzbekistan's cooperation with NATO has not always been on the rise. For example, after 2005, due to disagreements over actions in Andijan, Uzbekistan suspended participation in EAPC meetings. However, in 2007, NATO and Uzbekistan resumed regular dialogue through the EAPC. Based on the Partnership for peace program, Uzbekistan has started developing practical cooperation with the Alliance in a number of areas, including training military personnel, combating terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other international threats.

Turkmenistan has joined some NATO programs, but unlike other Turkic countries, its cooperation with this organization is limited by the country's neutrality. At the same time, there has been some intensification of Turkmenistan's cooperation since 2007, when the Republic began participating in a pilot project of the NATO-Russia Council to train personnel in Afghanistan and Central Asia in anti-drug control methods. In the literature, it was reported that in 2008, Turkmenistan agreed to use its territory for logistical support of the International security assistance forces, and Alliance aircraft were able to land at military.

Kyrgyzstan cooperates with NATO in such areas as defense reform and training of officials, and civil emergency planning. As part of the planning and analysis Process, the armed forces were modernized and compatible with the Alliance forces in order to meet common challenges and participate in PIM exercises. Kyrgyzstan's participation in the Partnership for peace program involves sharing information on military planning and " developing military cooperation with NATO in order to increase its ability to support Alliance operations." This fact makes Kyrgyzstan a weak link in the collective security Treaty Organization. (Эйвазов Д. 2001).

There is an opinion in the literature that the inefficiency of the mechanisms for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict proposed by the UN and the OSCE is one of the reasons that pushed Azerbaijan to cooperate with NATO. At the same time, it is indicated that NATO, along with the possibility of resolving this conflict, is able to play a significant role in maintaining the military and political security of Azerbaijan. (Бекиев Ж. 2002).

On November 19, 2002, the Republic of Azerbaijan was admitted as an associate member of the NATO parliamentary Assembly. In July 2006, Azerbaijan and NATO officially opened the Euro-Atlantic center in Baku, which serves as the main information center for NATO. Cooperation between NATO and Azerbaijan covers a fairly wide range of activities. But since 2011, the pace of cooperation between NATO and Azerbaijan has declined sharply, as Baku joined the non-aligned Movement, which, as we know, unites countries that have declared non-participation in military-political blocs and groupings as the basis of their foreign policy.

Thus, it can be noted that the Turkic countries of the post-Soviet space consider partnership with NATO as one of the priority directions of their foreign policy in the field of security. Integration into the North Atlantic Alliance programs gives the Turkic CIS countries formal protection from NATO members. In turn, NATO considers the territory of the Turkic States (Central Asian and Transcaucasian regions) as one of the key areas of its strategy aimed at expanding its influence in these regions. NATO seeks to weaken Russia's role in the post-Soviet space and prevent the Turkic States of this region from merging with the Islamic world.

It should be noted that initiatives for common Turkic integration were put forward by the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. A. Nazarbayev, who at the summit Of heads of Turkic-speaking States in Antalya in 2006 made proposals for the creation of several common Turkic structures, in particular the Permanent body of Heads of Turkic-speaking States, the parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-speaking States and the Council of Elders. The result of successful implementation of N. A.'s initiatives. Nazarbayev was undoubtedly the signing by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey on October 3, 2009 in the Azerbaijani city of Nakhchivan of the Agreement on the establishment of the Council of cooperation of Turkic-speaking States(CSTG), which became the basis for the creation of the first in the history of the Turkic world interstate Association of Turkic-speaking countries, designed to strengthen the unity of the Turkic peoples.

The 1st CSTG Summit was held on October 21, 2011 in Kazakhstan. The 1st FTS summit also addressed issues of national and regional security, strengthening the international community's fight against acts of aggression that threaten peace and stability, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and global security, among a wide range of issues. The sides stressed the importance of the peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the process of political stabilization in Kyrgyzstan. They also expressed support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan and Iraq, ensuring the rights and freedoms of the entire population.

In January 2013, the Association of law enforcement agencies of the military status of Eurasia, consisting of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, WAS established in Baku. This event was regarded as the first step towards the creation of a

pan-Turkist army – the "Army of the Great Turan" [8]. This DOES not imply the creation of unified security forces, which means that national formations or structures with the participation of Russia will have to deal with real threats in Central Asia. (Богатырев В.Б.2004).

Central Asian countries cannot ignore the role of Russia as a strategic and influential partner in the political arena. In the context of increasing threats in connection with the withdrawal of coalition troops from Afghanistan, the role of the CSTO (collective security Treaty Organization) is being updated, in which Moscow undoubtedly plays an important role. The CSTO is the only multilateral structure in Eurasia that is engaged in creating a system of collective security for several post-Soviet States and has a military-political dimension.

Among the Turkic States, the CSTO includes Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In 1999 (as part of the collective security Treaty), Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan withdrew from the Treaty. In 2006, Uzbekistan's membership in the CSTO was restored. However, on June 28, 2012, Tashkent sent a note notifying the suspension of Uzbekistan's membership in the CSTO.

Initially, within the CIS, multilateral cooperation in the military and political sphere took place within the framework of the collective security Treaty (CSTO), which was signed on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent. The increased terrorist threat in connection with the events of 11 September 2001 required the strengthening of the security structure in Central Asia. There was a question of transforming the CSTO into an international regional organization-the CSTO (2002). The creation of the CSTO can also be seen as a reaction of Russia to the expansion of NATO and the growth of US influence in the post-Soviet space.

Since 2004, the issue of the mechanism for peacekeeping activities of the collective security Treaty Organization has been developed. In 2006, a session of the CSTO SCB was held, at which the political Declaration On further improvement and increasing the effectiveness of the CSTO was signed. The Declaration contains tasks to adapt the organization to modern realities and to turn the CSTO into a multifunctional international security structure. Another important vector in the CSTO's activities is the formation of a unified migration and border policy.

Kazakhstan actively participates in the CSTO. Participation in the CSTO of Kazakhstan from a military point of view should be considered in terms of the emergence of asymmetric threats from its southern borders — international terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking, illegal migration.

From a political point of view, Kazakhstan's membership in the CSTO consists in an effort to maintain special, friendly relations with its neighbors, primarily with Russia. That is, for Kazakhstan, membership in the CSTO, on the one hand, is an important condition for ensuring national security, and on the other hand, has significant non-military goals. In 2012, Kazakhstan chaired the CSTO. During this time, the Organization has carried out several major operations to detect and stop illegal migration, human trafficking and drug trafficking, as well as strengthening the military component. The military Committee introduced a system of collective response to conflicts. Kazakhstan has played a major role in countering the threats emanating from Afghanistan. It was at the initiative of the Former President of Kazakhstan that the CSTO

member States analyzed the situation in Afghanistan and prepared a plan for localization of threats based on the forecast.

In General, it should be noted that cooperation in the field of regional security is an unshakable foreign policy priority of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Today, Kazakhstan's role in all regional structures designed to help maintain stability, including the CSTO, is very high. Kazakhstan is one of the most stable countries in Central Asia, on which the overall security in the region depends in many ways.

Another Turkic country participating in the CSTO is Kyrgyzstan. It is widely believed that the main force that keeps Kyrgyzstan in the CSTO is the need for Russia. As noted by V. B. Bogatyrev, progress in the issues of the Russian military base and Russia's participation in the development of the energy potential of Kyrgyzstan, the write-off of public debt significantly changes the attitude to the CSTO, creating prospects for Bishkek's participation in the work of this military-political Association at a new level. The Russian leadership's decision to transfer $ 1.1 billion worth of weapons, equipment and military equipment to Kyrgyzstan is also working in this direction [9]. It is possible that the strengthening of the role of Russia and the CSTO in the formation of military standards in Kyrgyzstan led to the intention of this country to cooperate with NATO in the framework of non-military programs.

At the same time, it is widely believed in Kyrgyzstan that NATO can ensure the country's security. Moreover, there is experience of Kyrgyzstan's appeal to the CSTO for help in 2010, during the inter-ethnic conflict in the South of the country. On the part of the CSTO, the events in Kyrgyzstan were regarded as an internal affair of this country. The potential of the CSTO can be used by the decision of the CSTO Council against external aggression against one of the CSTO members. The end result of the CSTO, Kyrgyzstan has provided technical and humanitarian assistance, but did not go for military intervention. (Никитина Ю.2009).

Kyrgyzstan chaired the CSTO in 2013. The action plan from the Kyrgyz side included countering modern threats and challenges, strengthening the CSTO's position, ensuring border security, and cooperation in emergency situations. In fact, within the framework of the CSTO, it was decided to create a security belt in the Central Asian region, where one of the important components is to ensure border security and strengthen borders (primarily of countries in the immediate vicinity of Afghanistan). Kyrgyzstan made a proposal to create such a belt.

Uzbekistan was one of the initiators of the creation of the collective security Treaty within the CIS. Uzbekistan's withdrawal in 1999, along with Georgia and Azerbaijan, from the military Treaty of the CIS countries can be explained by their disagreement with the strengthening of Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space through military cooperation. Another reason is the aggravation of relations between the participants of the DCB: Georgia and Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Western sanctions against Uzbekistan after the Andijan events, the events in Kyrgyzstan, and the continued build-up of Russia's military presence in the region led to the adjustment of Uzbekistan's foreign policy and its return to the CSTO in 2006. At the same time, the Uzbek side refrained from participating in many CSTO projects, in particular, it concerns cooperation in the military and military-technical spheres.

There is an opinion among experts that the suspension of Uzbekistan's participation in the CSTO in 2012 may mean that Tashkent has finally decided on its foreign policy orientation. According to B. akhmedkhanov, Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the CSTO will have virtually no consequences for the organization, since the role played by Uzbekistan in it is not a key one. (Ахмедханов Б.2001).

It is clear that Azerbaijan is not going to return to the CSTO, since Armenia is a traditional partner and ally of Russia.

The CSTO plays an important role in the multilateral diplomacy of the post-Soviet Turkic countries. But not all Turkic republics are now part of this organization, where Russia is the main pillar. Despite the diversification of ways and mechanisms for ensuring security, according to most experts, military-political cooperation between the countries of the region is based on the Russian factor, as the main guarantor of security in Central Asia. (А. Богатурова 2011).

It is necessary to mention another international organization, which includes the Turkic countries. This is the Shanghai cooperation organization, the Declaration on the establishment of which was signed at the meeting of 6 States (Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan) in Shanghai on June 15, 2001. At the summit in St. Petersburg on June 7, 2002, the SCO Charter was adopted, which is the basic Charter document that defines the goals, principles, structure and main activities of the organization.

THE RESULTS

For the Turkic countries of the Central Asian region, their participation in the SCO largely contributes to the discussion and solution of problems of security, economic, transport, and energy cooperation. The SCO plays an important role in ensuring international security and in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism.

Kazakhstan was the Chairman of the SCO from June 12, 2010 to June 15, 2011. Strengthening regional and global security has become the country's top priority as SCO Chairman. Kazakhstan has made a significant contribution to the development of the anti-Drug strategy of the SCO member States for 2011-2016, which was approved at the SCO anniversary Summit in Astana.

In Kyrgyzstan, the SCO is considered one of the most important mechanisms for ensuring regional security and stability. Kyrgyzstan was the first to call for the creation of an anti-terrorist structure in the SCO.

Along with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, another Turkic country participates in the SCO – Uzbekistan. As you know, the SCO's priorities are the fight against three evils: terrorism, extremism, and separatism. For this purpose, the headquarters of the regional anti-terrorist structure (rats) was opened in Tashkent in 2004.

The similarity of security threats for the three Turkic States participating in the Shanghai organization creates a platform for their cooperation. The main purpose of the SCO for the Turkic States is to strengthen regional security by improving the mechanism of multilateral consultations and agreements, in which all regional actors participate.

The SCO's interaction with the CSTO and NATO is of great importance. The Turkic member States of the SCO are also participants in the Meeting on interaction and confidence-building measures in Asia (CICA), the idea of which was put forward by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev at the 47th session of the UN

General Assembly in 1992. CICA is an international organization on the Asian continent that deals with issues of Asian and regional security. The CICA is not an international organization, but a forum for political dialogue and consultation. Today, the CICA unites 24 countries with a population of more than 3 billion people. The CICA includes almost all Turkic States: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.

During Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the CICA, first of all, an effective international structure was launched, concrete work was started on all five areas of cooperation, and work on institutionalization was completed when the Secretariat, a permanent administrative body, was created in 2006. The government of the Republic of Kazakhstan has an interdepartmental working group on strengthening the CICA.

On June 8, 2010, the 3rd CICA summit of heads of state and government was held in Istanbul (Turkey), where the Declaration "Building a joint approach to interaction and security in Asia"was adopted. The participants considered issues of strengthening of trust between the members of the CICA.

The role of the CICA as a mechanism for multilateral diplomacy, including that of the Turkic countries, is to expand cooperation through the development of multilateral approaches to promoting peace, security and stability in Asia. It is necessary to note the significant role of Kazakhstan in initiating, developing and strengthening this forum.

CONCLUSION

Given the above, we can say that the current issue of foreign policy of the new Turkic countries is, first of all, ensuring their national security. In this context, the foreign policy strategy of the Turkic States should ensure national military construction, develop a certain line of conduct in resolving conflict situations, and protect their own borders and interests. One of the ways to achieve this goal is the participation of Turkic countries in international regional associations and organizations of military and political cooperation. The participation of Turkic countries in both European and Asian regional organizations, as well as cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic military-political structure, indicates that the leadership of the Turkic States is aware of their place and role in global geopolitical and cultural-historical processes that Express the relationship between Western and Eastern civilization.

It should be noted that the Turkic countries participate both in consultative multilateral mechanisms (CICA) and in structures directly aimed at resolving issues related to the security of these countries (for example, in the SCO, cooperation with NATO), in military-political structures (CSTO).

Bilateral cooperation and partnership within the framework of the CSTO, SCO, CICA, OSCE and other regional organizations should be the Foundation for increasing joint efforts to strengthen and ensure the security of the new Turkic countries. For the most part, the Turkic States have to either balance between blocks or make a choice between them. At the present stage, the multi-vector foreign policy of the Turkic countries is growing.

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Халықаралық өңірлік ұйымдар шеңберіндегі жаңа түркі елдерінің әскери-саяси ынтымақтастығы

Аннотация. Жаңа түркі елдері (Әзербайжан, Қазақстан, Қырғызстан, Түркіменстан, Өзбекстан) Еуразия кеңістігін дамытуға зор үлес қосуда, сондықтан түркі әлемінің мұрасын, олардың қазіргі халықаралық қатынастардағы рөлі мен орнын терең зерттеуге толық негіз бар.

*Кілтті сөздер:*Түркі әлемі, геосаясат, Орталық Азия, халықаралық ұйым, қауіпсіздік.

Военно-политическое сотрудничество новых тюркских стран в рамках международных региональных организаций

Абстракт. Новотюркские страны (Азербайджан, Казахстан, Кыргызстан, Туркменистан, Узбекистан) вносят значительный вклад в освоение евразийского пространства, поэтому есть все основания для углубленного изучения наследия тюркского мира, их роли и места в современных международных отношениях.

Ключевые слова: Турецкий мир, геополитика, Центральная Азия, международная организация, безопасность.

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МРНТИ:

ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITES I-II MILLENNIA A.D. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MEDIEVAL HISTORY OF KAZAKHSTAN AND EURASIA (SOME RESULTS OF RESEARCH IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CULTURAL HERITAGE PROGRAM)

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Annotation. The purpose of the article is devoted to some results of archaeological research on the monuments of the I-II millennium AD, investigated under the national strategic program of the Republic of Kazakhstan «Cultural Heritage» in the period from 2004 to 2011, in the context of the medieval history of Kazakhstan and Eurasia.

Keywords: archaeological sites, culture, research, the program, the Turkic people.

Within the framework of the national strategic program "Cultural Heritage", research was carried out on almost all categories of archaeological sites of the widest chronological range - from antiquity to the late Middle Ages (Fig. 1).



Figure 1. - Archaeological sites explored under the program "Cultural Heritage"

The scientific research carried out on the archaeological monuments of the I-II millennia A.D. made a rather significant contribution to the study of the history of medieval Kazakhstan.

The number of historical and cultural objects of the first millennium of our era, studied within the framework of the Cultural Heritage program, includes archaeological monuments of the Hunno-Sarmatian period, ancient Turkic and other cultures of the early Middle Ages, the objects of research are mainly funerary and memorial and settlement monuments, urban cultural objects were also studied.

Almost all the studied monuments belong to several historical stages.

During the period of work under the national program, research was carried out on the Borizhary burial complex, which dates back to the I-VIII centuries AD, on the settlements of the I millennium AD Zhuantobe and Sidak in Southern Kazakhstan, on the monuments of ancient Turkic time and the early stages of the Middle Ages Merke, Zhaysan and Akyrtas in Zhambyl region, Sarykol in East Kazakhstan, Issyk in Almaty region. Also, one-time archaeological surveys were carried out on some monuments correlated with the I millennium AD, and the layers of these periods were recorded during surveys on objects of other historical epochs [1].

The Borizhara burial complex in Turkestan region, as a result of many years of research, including during the implementation of the national program, has provided extensive material on funeral and memorial monuments and related beliefs and ideological foundations of a number of regions of Eurasia of the I millennium AD. Possible influences on the cults and beliefs of the population of Southern Kazakhstan of religious movements of Iran, the Roman Empire and other countries of Central Asia and the Middle East are recorded [2, p.139], however, the authors of the studies of the monuments of Borizhara conclude that the religious canons of the tribes of Southern Kazakhstan of the I millennium AD have a local origin and originate from previous eras. At the same time, a certain influence of the leading cults and religions of that time from other regions of Eurasia is recognized [2, p. 140].

The monuments of urban culture of the I millennium A.D. Sidak and Zhuantobe, based on the results of archaeological surveys, among which research plays a significant role during the years of work on the national program, brought valuable materials to science concerning the role and place of early cities of Kazakhstan in the processes of urbanization of Eurasia of the I millennium A.D. Based on practical material and theoretical generalizations, it is recorded that these monuments played the role of interregional centers of a commercial and sacred nature, had extensive versatile connections with progressive centers of Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Middle East, China and Eastern Europe [3, p. 90-100;4,p. 378-408].

One of the important monuments of the I millennium AD is the Akyrtas fortress in the Zhambyl region. Researchers, having analyzed a significant layer of data obtained over many years of scientific research, including during the implementation of the national program, found that Akyrtas is identified with the medieval Kasribas and was built by order of the Arab commander Kuteiba [5, p. 217].

Scientists have recorded wide parallels of Akyrtas with the architectural and construction canons of the countries of the Near and Middle East, analogies can be traced in the medieval architecture of Syria, Jordan, Oman and other Arab states. According to all data, Aktyrtas is a monument that originated during the period of Arab religious and

missionary campaigns in Central Asia, Akyrtas' materials reflect a wide range of complex relationships and mutual influences of Arab and Turkic cultures of Eurasia [6, p. 399-413].

The next group of monuments, attributed to the second half of the I millennium AD, are the Turkic monuments of the early and developed stage. Among them, the monuments of Merke and Zhaysan in Zhambyl region, Sarykol in East Kazakhstan occupy a significant place in terms of the volume of work carried out during the years of the program implementation.

Researchers already in the initial periods of work within the framework of the state project assessed the contribution of early Turkic monuments of Kazakhstan to the study of the problems of the Turkic culture of Eurasia – the country's territory played the role of a cross-border space, where intensive processes of mixing and mutual influence of various ethnic, religious and cultural groups took place [7, p. 365-372; 8, p.151-159], the results of which significantly affected the ethnogenesis of the modern Turkic peoples of Eurasia.

According to the results of the work on these monuments, according to the state program, the authors of the research draw important conclusions about the autochthonous Turkic culture of Kazakhstan, about the significant influence of the Turkic historical and cultural community on the territory of our state on the formation of the Turkic world of Eurasia, extensive ties with the Turkic cultures of the Volga-Don region, Tyva, Altai, Mongolia, Central Asia, the Middle East are recorded East, Eastern Europe and other key regions of the Eurasian continent [8, p. 163-165].

In the course of the work within the framework of the presented topic, the author carried out comparative studies of the Turkic culture of Eurasia for the search and justification of the origins, based on the results of the work, a conclusion was made about the overwhelming autochthonous nature of the main Turkic peoples of Eurasia and direct continuity with the tribes and tribal unions of previous eras. At the same time, it is traced that in previous historical stages, not all ethno–cultural associations within the modern Turkic area were proto-Turkic - an opinion was expressed about the multilingualism and multiculturalism of tribes and peoples on the territory of the Turkic ecumene of Eurasia of our days in ancient periods, the heritage of ancient Turkic culture in the spiritual and material heritage of modern Turkic peoples of the Eurasian continent [10].Much of what has been said is confirmed by the research of a recognized specialist in Saka archeology and traditional culture of the Kazakh people A.T. Toleubayeva, a scientist based on her many years of versatile research, including within the framework of the national project, comes to the reasonable opinion that the Saka culture is basically more pro-Turkic than Indo-Iranian. And that in the future there are two possible solutions to this issue – either the Turkic basis of the Saka-Scythian culture and language will be generally recognized, or scientists will come to the conclusion that the Saka-Scythian cultural complex was formed as a result of the symbiosis of the Turkic and Indo-Iranian components [11,p. 349].

Summing up all that has been said, we can say that the territory of the country in the Hunno-Sarmatian era was one of the impulse centers of the beginning of the Great Migration of Peoples and the transformation of the ethnocultural picture of Eurasia, and that it was on the territory of Kazakhstan that the main processes of ethnogenesis of modern Turkic peoples of Eurasia took place.

During the period of scientific research, within the framework of the national program "Cultural Heritage", one of the most numerous archaeological monuments studied were medieval cities of Kazakhstan. Scientific research was carried out on such well-known monuments as Otyrar, Sauran, Zhuantobe, Karaspantobe, Sidak, Shymkent, Syganak, Sozak, Turkestan, etc. in Turkestan region, Talkhir, Koylyk in Zhetysu, Bozok in Akmola region, medieval monuments Akyrtas, Aktobe (Balasagun), Tuymekent, etc. in Zhambyl region, the settlements of Sarayshyk, Zhaiyk in Western Kazakhstan, Khan Ordasy in Karaganda region, Zhankent in Kyzylorda region.

Some monuments were investigated once with the support of local executive authorities and from other sources, but under the auspices of the national program; work was also carried out on archaeological monuments of the Middle Ages of funerary-memorial and settlement character in certain regions of Kazakhstan [1].

K.M. Baypakov carried out large-scale generalizing works on ancient and medieval cities and monuments of settled culture of Kazakhstan, including the results of work within the framework of the national program "Cultural Heritage". According to the results of analytical studies, scientists have identified several stages of the settled urban culture of Kazakhstan in the context of the urbanization of central Eurasia.

The proto–urbanizational stage is associated with the Bronze Age - fortified settlements and monuments of the proto-urban type of the paleometallic epoch of Kazakhstan were the primary basis of cities of subsequent periods, the features of their architectural and construction canons find wide analogies in synchronous monuments of the Eurasian continent [12, p. 372-373]. Moreover, it is possible that the sources of these general trends originate precisely from the territory of Kazakhstan – in the previous sections we have shown the place and role of paleometallic monuments in the ancient culture of the peoples of Eurasia.

The first stage of Kazakhstan's urbanization is associated with the era of the Early Iron Age and the first half of the I millennium AD, when fortified and open settlements of the Saks, Usuns and Sarmatians spread everywhere, the first urban-type monuments appear. Architectural and construction methods and techniques of monuments of funerary and memorial and settlement-urban character of these periods indicate the beginning of the formation of urban civilization [12, p. 374-376].

At the turn of the era and at the beginning of the I millennium AD, the Great Silk Road began to play a significant role in the development of urban culture in Eurasia, linking the advanced cultures of Europe, the Near and Middle East, India, the Caucasus, China, Central and Central Asia – almost all key regions of the Eurasian continent. The unprecedented trade road of antiquity and the Middle Ages played a kind of role as an artery of life – thanks to it, new and old cities appeared and flourished, yesterday's ordinary settlements, by historical standards, turned overnight into large interregional and even interstate political and economic centers, a rapid process of exchange of material and cultural achievements of the most remote regions of Eurasia [6, p. 470-485]. It is with the development of the Great Silk Road that the second and third stages of Kazakhstan's urbanization can be linked.

During this period, according to archaeological research, among which scientific research occupies an important place during the years of work on the national program, the intensity of the growth of cities in Kazakhstan and their socio-economic progress are significantly intensified, transcontinental ties are expanding, the territory of Kazakhstan

is increasingly beginning to play the role of a kind of center of interregional trade, cultural and religious interactions in the expanses of Eurasia. The processes of synthesis and mutual influence of the Turkic, Iranian-Sogdian, Arab and Mongol-Siberian cultures are expanding – the symbiosis of various ethnic, religious and even racial communities of middle Eurasia and other regions is actively proceeding, despite the periods of extinction and degradation that took place, primarily associated with the Mongol invasion and the subsequent defeat and devastation, for which were followed by the stage of a new renaissance, cities with a settled culture of Kazakhstan continued their development. Having become part of the Mongol Empire, the lands of Kazakhstan begin to play an even greater role in the political and socio-economic processes of Eurasia – the archaeological materials of the Golden Horde cities and other monuments of medieval Kazakhstan show the trade, diplomatic and other ties that took place with various, sometimes with the most remote corners of the Eurasian continent [12, p. 212-387; 13 p. 54-79].

The millennial processes of politogenesis, cultural genesis and ethnogenesis of the most diverse cultures and civilizations of Eurasia, which took place on the territory of Kazakhstan, eventually led to the formation of the Kazakh Khanate in the XV century, and the centuries-old synthesis of tribes, tribal unions and peoples of Eurasia, based on the core formed in the local environment, at least from the paleometallic era, ended with the formation of the Kazakh nation. The cities of the Golden Horde, after its departure from the political map of the Middle Ages, eventually became the headquarters of the Kazakh khans and continued to exist until the late Middle Ages, and some until modern times [13, p. 54-79].

It is obvious that the cities and settled culture of medieval Kazakhstan are based on the base of architectural and construction canons laid down in the era of the first settlements. Even more, it is not unreasonable to assume a significant influence of proto-cities of Kazakhstan on the formation and development of urbanization of the vast territory of Eurasia (259, pp. 93-117), however, it is obvious that due to its geographical location as a trans-border and transcultural territory, the urban civilization of Kazakhstan could not develop locally, and it is necessary to recognize the presence of Sogdian, Arabic, etc. Eurasian components in the culture of medieval cities in the history of the country.

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Археологические памятники I-II тысячелетий н.э. в контексте средневековой истории Казахстана и Евразии (некоторые результаты исследований в рамках программы «Культурное наследие»)

Аннотация. Целью статьи является посвящение некоторым результатам археологических исследований памятников I-II тысячелетий нашей эры, исследованных в рамках национальной стратегической программы Республики Казахстан «Культурное наследие» в период с 2004 по 2011 год, в контексте средневековой истории Казахстана и Евразии.

Ключевые слова: археологические памятники, культура, исследование, программа, тюркский народ.

Қазақстан мен Еуразияның ортағасырлық тарихы контекстіндегі археологиялық ескерткіштер I-II мыңжылдықтар (Мәдени мұра бағдарламасы шеңберіндегі зерттеулердің кейбір нәтижелері)

Аңдатпа. Мақаланың мақсаты - Казақстан Республикасында 2004-2001 жж. аралығында жүзеге асырылған «Мәдени Мұра» ұлттық стратегиялық бағдарламасы аясында б.д. I-II

мыңжылдықтарымен мерзімделетін археологиялық ескерткіштердегі зерттеу жұмыстарының бірқатар нәтижелеріне Еуразияның және Қазақстанның ортағасырлық тарихы хақында баға берілуі.

Түйін сөздер: археологиялық ескерткіштер, мәдениет, зерттеу, бағдарлама, түркі халқы.

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ТРАГИЧЕСКИЕ СТРАНИЦЫ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ РЕПРЕССИЙ В КАЗАХСТАНЕ

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Аннотация. Целью статьи является исторический анализ массовых политических репрессии в истории Казахстана и о политических преследованиях участников партии Алаш, высказывавших сомнения в правильности политики центра. О системе тюремных лагерей — Карлаг, Степлаг, АЛЖИР, а также другие структуры ГУЛАГа.

Ключевые слова: политика, репресий, казахская интеллегенция, лагерь, тоталитарный режим.

ВВЕДЕНИЕ

Современный полиэтнический состав населения Республики Казахстан складывался на протяжении длительного исторического периода. В первой половине XX-го века на многострадальной казахской земле развернулась чудовищная трагедия. Советская власть, казалось бы, призванная установить мир, справедливость и равенство, добро и свет, принесла народу огромные страдания. Тоталитарный режим искалечил судьбы миллионов людей. Трагедия состояла в том, что многие из уничтоженных репрессиями или пострадавшие от них участвовали в борьбе против царизма, были лидерами национально-освободительных движений, боролись за советскую власть, принимали активное участие в строительстве нового социалистического общества. В результате политических репрессий был уничтожен цвет казахской интеллигенции. Это Алихан Букейханов, Ахмет Байтурсунов, Миржакип Дулатов, Султанбек Ходжанов, Мухамеджан Тынышпаев, Санжар Асфендияров, Сакен Сейфуллин, Турар Рыскулов и др. Они были опорочены режимом как «враги народа», отступники от идей коммунизма. Репрессивная политика коснулась и членов их семей.

Голод 20-х и 30-х годов XX века, белый и красный террор, насильственная конфискация имущества и личного скота унесли жизни почти половины казахского народа. Миллионы казахов по воле «вождя народов» на своей исконной богатой земле были обречены на смерть и насилие. Помимо этого казахская земля превратилась в огромную тюрьму и место ссылки не только безвинно осужденных, но и депортированных народов.

Советская власть впервые в мировой практике осуществила депортацию целых народов. Насильственному переселению в Казахстан подверглись немцы, турки, корейцы, поляки, чеченцы, ингуши, калмыки, крымские татары, курды, иранцы и др. Переселение осуществлялось бесчеловечным образом. Тысячи людей преодолевали многодневный путь из самых разных уголков Советского Союза в товарных вагонах под строгой охраной ОГПУ. Массы раскулаченных, депортированных умирали в пути следования от сыпного тифа, желудочных заболеваний. Тысячами гибли они и в местах поселений. Особенно страшны были смерти детей. Чаще всего людей привозили и высаживали в голой степи. И люди вынуждены были выживать – они рыли землянки, сооружали бараки из самана, которые летом не просыхали, а зимой промерзали. В таких скудных жилищах ютилось по 50-70 человек с одной печкой на всех. Безжалостно возвращали и наказывали тех, кто осмеливался на побег.

Система концентрационных лагерей ГУЛАГ-а начала создаваться уже в годы гражданской войны. В специальном Постановлении СНК РСФСР от 5 сентября 1918 года, в частности, говорилось: «…необходимо обезопасить Советскую республику от классовых врагов путем изолирования их в концентрационных лагерях». В 1929 году, по указанию И.Сталина был подготовлен план по развертыванию сети исправительно-трудовых лагерей, а 7 апреля 1930 года было принято специальное положение об этих лагерях. Так был образован ГУЛАГ.

Репрессивная политика была направлена не столько против явных политических оппонентов, сколько против противников мнимых. При этом люди в подавляющем большинстве случаев подвергались репрессиям не за какие-либо их слова или действия, а за принадлежность к той или иной группе (социальной, национальной и т.д.), которую власть в данный момент объявляла враждебной.

ГУЛАГ, являясь огромной «империей» внутри Советского Союза, состоял из 53-х лагерей, 425 исправительно-трудовых лагерей, в том числе 170 промышленных, 83 сельскохозяйственных и 172 «контрагентных» (работающих на стройках и хозяйствах), и 50 колоний для несовершеннолетних. Таким образом, в годы тоталитарного режима на территории Советского Союза было 953 лагеря. Система ГУЛАГ-а включала в себя спецпоселения (ссылка), колония (для осужденных на срок менее 3 лет) и лагеря. Затем в систему ГУЛАГ были включены «Бюро исправительных работ», которое ведали лицами, приговоренными к принудительным работам без лишения свободы.

93 лагеря зловещей гулаговской системы истребления людей было размещено на территории Казахстана. Через них прошли судьбы от одного до полутра миллионов заключенных из 15 стран мира. Это были особые исправительно-трудовые лагеря и колонии, спецпоселения ОГПУ – НКВД, ставшие неизменным компонентом советской действительности эпохи Сталина.

Только 1937-1938 гг. в Казахстане репрессированных было 118 тысяч. Из них более 25 тысяч было расстреляно. В нашу страну был депортирован миллион двести человек разных национальностей. Казахстан стал вторым домом для тех, кто оказался здесь не по своей воле.

Была продумана и правовая база для проведения массовых репрессий. Уже в 1926 г. УК РСФСР из 17 конкретных видов контрреволюционных преступлений к 12 предусматривалось применение высшей меры наказания – расстрела. Начиная с 1934 г. одно за другим следовали изменения в уголовном законодательстве. В результате, для расследования дел о террористических организациях и террористических актах против советской власти отводился срок, не превышающий 10 дней. В 1937 г. органам НКВД было официально разрешено применять к арестованным «физические меры воздействия»; была исключена возможность обжалования приговоров и смертные приговоры стали исполняться немедленно. Была пересмотрена структура системы НКВД СССР, ее кадровый состав, созданы внесудебные органы с функциями – «Особое совещание», «Тройки», а затем и «Двойки» [1].

В 1930-е годы в Казахстане была образована целая сеть исправительно-трудовых лагерей. Самым большим из них был Карагандинский исправительно-трудовой лагерь, просуществовавший более 20 лет и расположившийся на территории в 1 млн. 780 тыс. гектаров земли [2].

В государственном архиве Карагандинской области содержится комплекс документов, касающихся истории развития и деятельности Карлага НКВД. В основном это постановления и решения бюро Карагандинских обкома и горкома компартии Казахстана, на которых рассматривались различные вопросы хозяйственной деятельности Карлага, а также справки, докладные записки о подготовке совхозов Карлага к посевным работам, о состоянии животноводства и т. др.

Несомненный интерес у исследователей на сегодняшний день вызывает такие фонды: «фонд политотдела Карлага», «Управление МВД по Карагандинской области», «Управление Саранского исправительного-трудового лагеря и стройтельство НКВД СССР», «Управление исправительно-трудового лагеря и стройтельство угольного разреза», «Шокайская трудовая воспитательная колонна (ТВК) № НКВД Каз ССР», «Управление лагеря военнопленных №99 МВД СССР», «Управление наркомата юстиции Каз ССР» и многие другие.

В открывшихся документах можно наглядно увидеть, как был создан и четверть века существовал огромный лагерно-партийно-промышленно-сельскохозяйственный гибрид. Несмотря на определенные «достижения» он по своей природе был крайне неэффективен в экономике. Он подавлял людей, транжирил человеческий труд и природные ресурсы. «Карлаг» и «АЛЖИР», как и весь Гулаг жил в мире жестокости и иллюзий.

Одной из трагических страниц истории Казахстана является депортация на его территорию народов практически со всех регионов бывшего Советского Союза.

Уже с начала 30-х годов будущая Карагандинская область стала местом ссылки крестьян из так называемых кулацких и байских хозяйств. Национальный состав трудпереселенцев 30-х гг. был весьма разнообразен. Основную массу «кулаков» составляли русские, украинцы и немцы, но среди них немало было

казахов, поляков, белорусов, татар, евреев, эстонцев, мордвы, армян, литовцев и др. [3].

По данным казахстанских историков в период коллективизации в Казахстан было выслано 189 тыс. человек из Центральных областей России. Из них в самый разгар голода, в мае 1931 г., 150 тыс. человек было размещено в районах нынешней Акмолинской, Карагандинской, Павлодарской, Кокчетавской областей. По неполным данным, к 1937 г. число высланных в Казахстан составило 360 тыс. человек [4]. Число высланных из года в год прибавлялось.

Расселенные в Карагандинской области трудпереселенцы работали не только в сельской местности, но и на различных промышленных предприятиях области. В документах Карагандинского облисполкома приведен перечень более 70 предприятий, учреждений и организаций, в которых в 30-х годах работали переселенцы [5].

В материалах Карагандинского облисполкома, горисполкома и ряда райисполкомов за 30-40-е годы отложились списки кулацких и байских хозяйств, расселенных на территории области, списки граждан, находящихся на поселении и лишенных избирательных прав, личные дела и заявления трудпоселенцев о восстановлении их в избирательных правах. В фондах райисполкомов за 1943-1945 гг. находятся решения по вопросам освобождения ряда лиц от трудпоселения и восстановления их в гражданских правах за заслуги в работе в годы Великой Отечественной войны.

Приток спецпереселенцев в Казахстан, и в Карагандинскую область в частности, увеличился во второй половине 30-х годов, когда депортация народов, проводимая Советским правительством, приняла массовый характер.

По различным данным в Казахстане в период Великой Отечественной войны находилось на спецпоселении от 900 тыс. до 1 млн. 209 тыс. человек [6]. Представители практически всех народов, депортированных в Казахстан, находились на спецпоселении в Карагандинской области. С февраля 1948 г., в связи с Указом Президиума Верховного Совета СССР «О направлении особо опасных государственных преступников по отбытии наказания в ссылку на поселение в отдаленные местности СССР», список спецпереселенцев, депортированных из различных регионов Советского Союза и расселенных на территории Карагандинской области пополнился лицами, освобожденными из Карлага и поставленными на учет в спецкомендатуры [7].

Согласно данным, содержащихся в справке Карагандинского обкома КП Казахстана, на 1 августа 1948 г. на территории Карагандинской области проживало в общей сложности 39990 семей – 117043 человека спецпереселенцев различных национальностей. Для учета спецпереселенцев в области было образовано 113 спецкомендатур МВД [8], выполняющих роль распорядительных органов.

Спецпереселенцы не имели документов, не могли без специального разрешения покидать места проживания, самовольная отлучка за установленные пределы считалась побегом. В определенные дни спецпереселенцы должны были отмечаться в комендатурах, а главы семей – ставить в известность работников комендатур обо всех изменениях в семье.

За годы своего существования (с 1931 по 1956 гг.) Карлаг принял около миллиона человек. Но поскольку архивы Карлага до сегодняшнего дня мало изучены, нет возможности назвать даже приблизительное число его жертв.

В поселке Долинка (50 км. к юго-западу от сегодняшней Караганды) располагался административный центр Карлага. Большое двухэтажное здание бывшего управления Карлага, в котором сейчас размещается музей памяти жертв политических репрессий, - величественная постройка с колоннами, выполненная в духе советского неоклассицизма, дом офицеров, бывший культурным центром для местных военных; дом техники, где проходили выставки достижений народного хозяйства; родильный дом и здание молельного дома, а также многочисленные развалины саманных построек, возведенных когда-то самими заключенными, составляют основной перечень довольно мрачных достопримечательностей. Эти здания управления Карлага сохранилось чудом. В 2011 году зданию лагерного управления был присвоен статус исторического памятника, охраняемого государством, и началось его восстановление. В этом году 31 мая открылся музей памяти жертв политических репрессий.

Годы молчания, за которым стоят, с одной стороны, страх разоблачения и расплаты, а с другой – тяжесть и унизительность воспоминаний безвинно осужденных, долго скрывали от нас истинные масштабы политических репрессии. И все же со временем, усилиями многих людей стираются «белые пятна», и картина массового террора против собственного народа проступает все явственней. История помнит женское горе, страдания и мучения матерей и детей в Акмолинском лагере, расположенном в селе Малиновка (ныне село Акмол Акмолинской области), где 70 лет тому назад тысячи ни в чем неповинных женщин оказались за колючей проволокой, оторванные от семьи и детей. Это место и поныне является немым свидетелем человеческой трагедии XX века. Во исполнение поручения первого президента Республики Казахстан Назарбаева Н.А., Постановлением акимата города Астаны от 26 февраля 2007 года был создан «Музейно-мемориальный комплекс жертв политических репрессий «АЛЖИР». Музей работает со дня открытия 31 мая 2007 года во вновь построенном здании на территории печально известного Акмолинского лагеря жен изменников родины.

Именно здесь в начале 1938 г. На базе 26-ого трудпоселка (позже ИТЛ Р-17) было открыто Акмолинское женское спецотделение один из трех островов «Архипелага ГУЛАГ», куда власть свозила тех, кто получил свои сроки. В разговорах между собой акмолинские узницы иронично называли свой остров экзотическим словом АЛЖИР – Акмолинский лагерь жен изменников родины.

Здесь томились в заключении более 18 тыс. женщин, осужденных Особым совещанием НКВД СССР [9]. Отбывали свои сроки жены, родственницы видных государственных деятелей страны, военных, ученых, писателей, дипломатов. Достаточно напомнить, что в АЛЖИР-е отбывали сроки: жена Бухарина, сестры Тухачевского, сестры Гамарника, жена Блюхера, жена и дочь Енукидзе, жена Крестинского, жена и сын Пятницкого. А также жены Рыскулова, Асфендиарова, Нурмакова, Майлина, Жургенова, известная артистка Лидия Русланова, мать Булата Окуджавы, бывшая возлюбленная Колчака…, и многие другие [10].

Таким оброзом мероприятия памяти репрессированных проводятся в Казахстане с 1993 года. После выхода в свет Закона РК "О реабилитации жертв

массовых политических репрессий" от 14 апреля 1993 года начался новый этап процесса реабилитации безвинно осужденных. Данный закон предусматривает восстановление в гражданских правах жертв репрессий, устранение иных последствий произвола со стороны государства, обеспечение компенсации материального и морального ущерба. В 1997 году указом главы государства 31 мая объявлен Днем памяти жертв политических репрессий. С того времени каждый год в этот день на месте бывшего лагеря проходит митинг, приезжают родные, чтобы почтить память своих близких. Теперь уже дети и внуки узников со слезами на глазах читают высеченные на мемориальной доске имена своих родных.

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Қазақстандағы саяси қуғын-сүргіннің қайғылы беттері

Аңдатпа. Мақаланың мақсаты-Қазақстан тарихындағы жаппай саяси қуғын-сүргінге және Орталық саясатының дұрыстығына күмән келтірген Алаш партиясының қатысушыларының саяси құдалауына тарихи талдау жасау. Түрме лагерлерінің жүйесі туралы
- Карлаг, Степлаг, АЛЖИР, сондай-ақ Гулагтың басқа да құрылымдары.

Түйін сөздер: саясат, репрессия, қазақ зиялылары, лагерь, тоталитарлық режим.

Tragic pages of political repressions in Kazakhstan

Annotation. The purpose of the article is a historical analysis of mass political repression in the history of Kazakhstan and the political persecution of members of the Alash party who expressed doubts about the correctness of the center's policy. About the prison camp system - Karlag, Steplag, ALZHIR and other structures of the Gulag.

Keywords: politics, repression, Kazakh intelligentsia, camp, totalitarian regime.

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