
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MULTICULTURALISM AND NATTION-BUILDING IN CONTEMPORARY KAZAKHSTAN

Punit Gaur

Introduction

The complexity of multiculturalism has always been central to the political concerns of European countries since 19th century. It enfolds various different concerns like language, migration, ethnicity, citizenship and religion. All these dimensions preponderate with conflicting political circumstances. It reproduced anxiety in different countries and its peoples. After the break-up of Soviet Union in 1991, and the revival of ethnic nationalism in the East, revealed the questions of transference of power from central national governments to regional based subnational groups and the possibilities of power-sharing at the centre. On the other hand, in the era of globalization where East meets West and South meets North, creates another complex dimension

of multiculturalism based on continuity and discontinuity. Multiculturalism also deals with the growing numbers of geopolitical situation in the context of Eurasian integration. Most recently, in the wake of religious extremism in the world and the ensuing contention of super powers like U.S.A., China and Russia at large, created another debate on multiculturalism. It is also concerned with the hazards posed by different countries on border issues. Most often under the concept of multiculturalism questions of ethnicity, religion and nationality are addressed. Although it is also important to take into account cultural differences through such measures as gender, age, disability, and other aspects of identity and social equality. The concept of multiculturalism comes into complex and ambiguous relationship with the ideology of nationalism. The issue of nationalism is associated with aspects of ethnic and national identity, particularly acute in the era of social transformation. The purpose of the present research is the implementation of a sociological conceptualization of multiculturalism as a policy concept and to understand the social practices of intercultural interaction in a transformed society.

It was mid of 20th century when in developed countries a new dimension of relationship between citizens and the state was formed primarily based on value and legal system, and it created another form of interaction between citizen, the state and society. In this context protection of the constitutional rights and freedom of citizen irrespective of their nationality, civil unity of the society, peace, nonviolence and tolerance are some of the attributes of this new dynamics. On the other hand it also created a situation where the political and ideological discussion of diversity in negative sense also took place which is the part of demographic deviance, migration policy, matter of citizenship, language differentiations and economic and territorial-political conflict.

Multiculturalism being a social phenomenon is based on intercultural communication, as its ideological platform and the end result. The problems of multicultural interactions must be considered in conjunction of a number of approaches. Evolutionist, functionalist and interpretative model, reveals the laws and principles of intercultural communication in the dynamics of socio-cultural changes on the macro level and in everyday interactions, enriched by the prospect of social criticism, which sharpens the problems of inter-ethnic conflict, inequality and discrimination. The conceptual framework of critical social theory not only reveals the causes and characteristics of conflicts at the level of the institutions of power, employment, education, social support, but also at the level of hierarchy of ethnic differences and ethnic groups in everyday situations and the systems of everyday social practices.

The domestic experience of managing a multiethnic state, the concept of nation-building and national policies contain both achievements and shortcomings that need to be assessed in the context of modern migration processes, issues of citizenship and new forms of ethnic inequality. Awareness of the multiplicity of contemporary identities should be supported by the ideology and practice of positive cross-cultural interaction. The policy of multiculturalism, concerning all aspects of public life in the first place and culture can alleviate social inequalities and prevent conflict. Multiculturalism as a policy and practice is formed at various levels: the individual experiences in daily life, culture, media, institutions and organizations, law and public policy.

International theory and practice of multiculturalism has a number of contradictions, caused by political differences and the complex nature of social reality that is difficult to take into account when planning the legal conditions for social integration. Multiculturalism as a new principle in the field of culture, ethnic relations, and public policy is contrary to the ideology of the nation-state, speaking of post-national strategy. In the modern democratic state there is a crisis of traditional views on human rights with the attempts to use universalistic norms in multiethnic communities leading to conflict.

The concept of "multiculturalism" is generally used in three perspectives. One is political, in which the opinions are "for" or "against" the policy of multiculturalism and the corresponding control method, and followers and challengers use the phrase. It is in this context in Canada in 1960 the concept originated. Second context is empirical, descriptive or analytical in nature. It takes place in scientific works and in the public debate, involving the various manifestations of cultural heterogeneity of society, and is most closely associated with the emergence of "multicultural society." The third relates to the context of social and political philosophy, to social and political order and human rights in the heterogeneity of the culture of a society (Therborn, 2001).

In terms of origin, and social dynamics there are four main types of multicultural societies. The first form includes pre-modern empire. Pre-modern empires were only by mishap, if ever aspired to be in cultural amalgamation of their topics. These empires were shaped as a result of invasion; imperial rule demanded from its subjects only acquiescence and reception of its rule, the tribute and / or taxes. As a rule, these empires were highly religious, linguistic and authoritarian in nature. This type of society existed in Eastern and Central-Eastern Europe in the framework of Polish-Lithuanian Union, Habsburg and Romanov, the Ottoman Empire, which included most of the Arab world, in the Persian Empire, the Mughal Empire in northern India and had larger and more unified core in the Chinese Celestial Empire. The previous pre-modern empires were abandoned during the First World War. Communist Soviet Union and communist Yugoslavia started mono-cultural multinational state after the Second World War (Therborn, 2001).

The second type of multicultural societies is - the settlement of the New World. As both America and Australia suffered depopulation as a result of the genocide that occurred mainly due to the European invasions and spread of germs and infectious diseases, but also as a result of deliberate violence, and were re-settled as a result of large-scale immigration from Europe. With the exception of Guatemala and Bolivia the majority of present inhabitants of the New World are from Europe. But there was exceptions like Ecuador and Peru which was located in the Andes, and in New Zealand aborigines and make up more than 10 percent of the population. The

Europeans went to America for, developing the idea of the "melting pot" in which representatives of various ethnic groups remelted into a single American identity.

The third type is countries in the former colonial zone. It was the province stretching from West Africa across the Indian sub-continent and the archipelago of Southeast Asia to what is nowadays called Papua New Guinea. This region was dominated and subjugated by the European authorities, but has not undergone such a strong depopulation and moved similar to what was in the New World.

The fourth, the modern type of multicultural societies concerns the post-national multiculturalism. The modern concept of multiculturalism is generated by a cultural dynamics, which was neither pre-national, as in the pre-modern empires, nor creates the nation as in the New World. It is a post-national scenario as occurred after the successful creation of the nations, and takes place in the borders of nation-states. Its development is due to the massive spread of higher education in the 1960s and the new audio-visual and musical popular culture.

Post-national multiculturalism is sporadic and variable and is often the consequence of self-affirmation of ethnic groups, while other types of multicultural societies, especially the premodern empires were in this respect more static. Multiculturalism was in such societies more inherited than re-emerging. At present, mass communication and the capacity for mass engagements create conditions for novel arrangements of "cultural hybridization".

In this context the debate between diverging and converging narratives, against and in support of the applicability multiculturalism, has produced almost opposing trends in academia, government policies and societies. Where amalgamation, assimilation, inclusion or incorporation are some of the words illustrating the converging narratives; inequality, segregation, exclusion or religious extremism emphasise the diverging narratives counter to the ethos of multiculturalism.

This debate becomes imperative given that most modern states today are, at least to some degree, culturally diverse. Such deliberations gain further significance in societies and states with established variability in terms of cultural traditions, language, migration patterns, citizenship and religion, with multiple ethnic groups residing there. These multiple identity defining notions become more vital not only for personal and group identity formation but also for the larger project of nation building.

One of the Central Asia's most pregnant lineaments, in this context, is its ethnic and cultural diversity. Complex historical processes have created ethnically diverse states, which have had an enormous influence on the current shape of the region. Human beings invent their identity through the culture which socialized them. The concept 'civilization' refers to a collective, plural and non-hierarchical phenomenon, since every civilization has been enriched by contacts and exchange with the other. History is a shared experience. Historical relationship exists between nomadic and sedentary peoples, existing in pretty diverse environments-steppes and oases- played a significant part in determining the cultural diversity of Central Asia and made an important contribution to its originality. On the territory of Central Asia for thousands of years thrived various civilizations that have left unique master pieces of material and spiritual culture.

Thirty years have passed since the Central Asian republics received their independence. This 30th anniversary is an excellent occasion to stare at how these states are organizing the statebuilding practices and in particular what symbolic or ideological defenses they are extending for their action.

The dynamics and apparatus of ethno-political courses in post-Soviet Kazakhstan raise questions of ideology and politics of social stability of multi-ethnic societies. In justifying the new strategies of multiculturalism, the researchers argue that political decisions for the Prohibition of extremism cause new global risks and challenges to the culture of peace and tolerance (Agamirov, 2004).

This study focuses particularly on Kazakhstan which is going to celebrate its 29th anniversary of the state independence and sovereignty. The regaining of Kazakh national statehood coincided with disintegration of Soviet Union, which resulted in the formation of fifteen new independent states. Cummings (2005) states that Kazakhstan was born by default as the republic's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 was neither the result of secessionist demands by its leadership, nor a national liberation movement; it resulted from the decision by Moscow to withdraw its maintenance of the Soviet edifice. But historically, present day Kazakhstan is the result of centuries-long emerging and fading of tribes in the vast steppe between the Altai and Volga. In this context the development of separate statehood was prolonged, due to the nomadic lifestyle of the tribes living on the territory and to numerous penetrations from outside, ethnic migration movements and, last but not the least, due to everlasting inner struggles for power among various Kazakh tribal groups.

Historically part of the Russian Empire, Kazakhstan, as its margin to the early twentieth century existed under the pre-modern empire; the USSR began to create in the republic another reality, which is called mono-cultural multi-ethnic state. After independence, the type of society that is generated in Kazakhstan can be attributed to the fourth type of multicultural society - a post-national. However, this is not the post-national multiculturalism in its purest form. However, the experience of interaction between different cultures in the Republic of Kazakhstan has its own characteristics. The first is connected with the presence of a republic within the Soviet Union, which Western analysts refer to as mono-cultural multi-ethnic state. In the Soviet period, multi-ethnic composition of the republic was finally formed. Although expansion was intended on the pattern of monoculture in Kazakhstan, But there was a further stripe of development, which, performing on the "informal" domestic echelon has been directed on interface and common enrichment of cultures. Examples of this can be found in cultural life of modern Kazakhstan.

Inter-ethnic collaboration in the Kazakhstan has undergone noteworthy changes in recent past. In the course of economic and political reforms, new social groups generated in society approved by free-thinking and tolerance. The democratization of society has created conditions for the restoration and advancement of culture and languages of Kazakhstan's peoples. This expansion is supported by the people of all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, which is the sign of the coordination of interethnic associations.

It raises two pertinent challenges: the degree to which cultural diversity could be 'accepted or tolerated' and how well cultural diversity could be accommodated. Aside to the state efforts, there is needed to explore the experiences in everyday life of these societies and people living there, through the lens of multiculturalism. In this context this study deliberates on a demographic depiction, an ideology, a set of policies and principals and a political theory of modern society to explore the nuances of multiculturalism in Kazakhstan.

Multiculturalism and ethnic identities in Kazakhstan

Contemporary Kazakhstan has more than 130 ethnic groups and 17 religions hence the issue of inter-ethnic relation and social cohesion gains more significance and can be understood with the historical demographic settlement in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan, situated in the heart of the Eurasia, has very rich cultural diversity which can be described in the context of different ethnic identities. It is also a known fact that before it became the part of first the Russian empire and then Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was almost homogenous, there was only Kazakh nation or dominance of Kazakh tribes which were nomadic in nature.

According to first census in 1897, Kazakhs were almost 82 percent of whole population. The demographic composition of the population living on the territory of today's Kazakhstan changed radically since the end of the nineteenth century. According to the census of 1897 (by this time many Russians had migrated to the Kazakh steppe), Kazakhs still comprised 81.8 percent of the total population of 4.1 million. Russians accounted for 11 percent of the

inhabitants, and other ethnic groups 7.2 percent. Continued massive immigration of settlers raised the Russian share to 29.6 percent by 1917, by this time Kazakhs had fallen to 58.5 percent (and "others" had increased to about 12 percent). A key event that shaped Kazakhstan's demography in the twentieth century was the collectivization of agriculture, which in the case of Kazakhstan also meant massive forced sedentarization. In the period from 1929 to 1936 alone, famine and other causes reduced the number of Kazakh households from 1,233,000 to 565,000.

The major cause of the famine was the precipitous drop (almost 80 percent) in the number of livestock in Kazakhstan. This was especially serious as animal husbandry was the core of the Kazakhs' livelihood and source of food. Out-migration from Kazakhstan, some of it to China, also contributed to loss of population. During the Soviet period, the ethnic composition of Kazakhstan's population also changed due to number of factors many of which were brought by presence of large numbers of non-Kazakhs into the republic.

Most significant amid these migrations included the deportation of "penalized peoples" to Kazakhstan in the 1930s and early 1940s, with Kazakhstan as a site for prison labour camps, the Virgin Lands program of the late 1950s, and a long-standing policy of All-Union ministries' dispatching workers from other regions of the USSR to Kazakhstan. By around 1960, the Kazakh share of the republic's population reached its low, about 30 percent. By this time the Russian share had grown to almost 43 percent, and the total Slavic share (including Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Poles) was around 52 percent. In addition, the German population, mostly deported to the region during World War II, had grown to 7 percent. Primarily due to their relatively high birth-rate, by the time of the last Soviet census 1989, the percentage of Kazakhs had substantially recovered, to around 40 percent. By this time, the Russian share (over 37 percent) had fallen to less than the Kazakh, and other ethnic groups – including about 7 percent non-Russian Slavs (mostly Ukrainians) and almost 6 percent Germans – accounted for the remaining approximately 22 percent. No other individual ethnic group accounted for more than about 2 percent of the total.


One of the most important facts about Kazakhstan's demography at the end of the Soviet era is that while Kazakhs accounted for over 57 percent of the republic's total rural inhabitants, in urban locales they barely exceeded 27 percent. Taking the republic's urban areas as a whole, Russians (almost 51 percent) outnumbered Kazakhs by a ratio of almost 2:1. On the other hand, in rural areas, the Kazakh share of about 57 percent meant that they outnumbered Russians (under 20 percent) by almost 3:1. The combined Ukrainian and German share of the urban population was about 11 percent, with the remaining approximately 11 percent split among many other ethnic groups.

Nationalit y	1897 %	1911 %	1926 %	1939 %	1959 %	1970 %	1979 %	1989 %
Kazakh	73.9	60.8	59.5	38.0	30.0	32.6	36.0	39.7
Russian	12.8	27.0	18.0	40.2	42.7	42.4	40.8	37.4
Ukrainian	*	*	12.4	10.8	8.2	7.2	6.1	5.4
German	-	-	0.7	1.5	7.1	6.6	6.1	5.8
Tatar	1.1	1.1	0.7	1.6	1.5	2.2	2.1	2.0
Uzbek	1.3	1.1	3.2	1.7	1.1	1.7	1.8	2.0
Belarusian	*	*	-	0.5	1.2	1.5	1.2	1.1
Uyghur	-	-	-	-	0.6	0.9	1.0	1.1
Korean	-	-	-	-	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6

Ethnic Composition from 1897 to 1989

Source: The Agency on the Statistic of the Republic of Kazakhstan

After the demise of Soviet Union, there have been two censuses in Kazakhstan in 1999 and 2009. Between these two censuses the population of the republic increased by 1028.3000 people, population growth in comparison with the previous census in 1999 was 6.9 percent.



Share of Ethnic Groups in Total Population-2009

Source: the Agency on the Statistic of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

According to 2009 census, Kazakhstan as a multi-ethnic state, hosts over 130 ethnic groups and nationalities. Numerically larger (exceeding 1 % of the total population) ethnic groups are: Kazakhs, Russians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Uyghurs, Tatars and Germans, which account for 95.6 % of the total population. Kazakhs (63.1 %) and Russians (23.7 %) account for the largest shares of the total population with Uzbeks (2.9 %), Ukrainians (2.1 %), Uyghur (1.4 %), Tatars (1.3 %), Germans (1.1 %) and other ethnic groups accounting for 4.4 % of the population.

Ethnic identities in the context of multiculturalism are significant tools to understand the relation between ethnic minorities and dominant ethnic group. The settlement of ethnic groups and status of their language, religion and relation with each other are important factors to understand the relation between ethnic identities and multiculturalism.

Various ethnic groups and their relation with each other and particularly with Kazakh ethnic group would be important to understand whether multiculturalism contributes constructive or deconstructive elements in today's Kazakhstan. Thus it can be said that discussion of multiculturalism cannot be separated from issues of nationhood and national identity which is particularly based on ethnic identity in Kazakhstan. To maintain democracy and social cohesion in today's Kazakhstan it is important to understand the main challenges of multiculturalism in Kazakh society. The aim in Kazakhstan is to develop a kind of policy related to nation and ethnic groups which is conducive to the concept of multiculturalism.

Challenges of multiculturalism in Kazakhstan

In today's world there are many multicultural states. Question is that how these states can achieve peaceful coexistence and harmony? It has become more significant when every ethnic group and religion has their own interests and it has become a challenge for the nations to ensure coexistence of all these various groups integrated with the processes of nationalism.

It is believed that in the twenty five years of independence, Kazakhstan has formed a special way of interethnic relation. Kazakhstan model of ethnic and religious tolerance provides a ground where it could be understood how a nation with different ethnic groups could be multiculturalist in nature and what challenges it faces to maintain independence and territorial integrity. It depicts a picture on how to maintain inter-ethnic and inter-religious peace with economic and political stability along with these challenges.

In addition, it is impossible to ignore the fact that approaching its 25th year of independence; the ethnic structure of Kazakhstan's society has changed significantly. In the census of 2009, the share of Kazakhs in the population reached 60.4 percent (9.5 mln. people); the share of Russian is 24.5 percent (3.8 mln. People), the other ethnic groups accounted for 15.1 percent. Over these years the number of representatives of European ethnic groups almost doubly reduced at the same time the number of representatives of Asian ethnic groups increased by almost doubling. All these changes, continuing to this day, inevitably impact interethnic relations in the country and require continuous monitoring of various challenges of multiculturalism like language, migration, citizenship, education, religion and etc.

Language Policy:

The President of Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev asked Kazakhstanis to speak at least three languages, Kazakh, Russian and English. He emphasized on '*Knowledge of the three languages is our future. The world becomes more globalized, and future generations need to be able to adjust to a multilingual environment*', at a meeting with journalists from Kazakhstan's leading mass media.

He also stated in his Address to the people of Kazakhstan:

'Kazakhstanis have started to learn the state Kazakh language with respect and dignity. We will keep developing the Russian and other languages of ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan. For a citizen of the modern Kazakhstan, knowing three languages is essential to his prosperity. Therefore, I believe that by 2020 the number of people speaking English should reach at least 20percent of the population.'

As 2009 census data shows that 14,965,600 people (93.5 percent) selected their ethnic language as their native language; 1,044,000 thousand people (6.5 percent) chose another ethnic group's language as their native language. 98.9 percent of Kazakhs, 98.8 percent of Russians, 96.3 percent of Dungans, 95.4 percent of Uzbeks, 92.8 percent of Turks, 92.4 percent of Tajiks, 85.0 percent of Uyghurs, 77. 8 percent of Chechens, 73.7 percent of Kyrgyz and 73.4 percent of Azerbaijanis selected their ethnic language as their mother tongue. Only 51.0 percent of Tatars, 36.0 percent of Koreans, 17.0 percent of Germans, 15.8 percent of Ukrainians, 13.0 percent of Belarusians and 9.3 percent of Poles selected their ethnic language as their mother tongue. During the census, special attention was paid to Kazakh, Russian and English language skills to identify the extent of knowledge of each of these languages.

Country wise Population	Population size of this ethnic	language, thousand persons		size of this language,		, in %
	group, thousand persons	own nationality	other nationality	language of own nationality	language of other nationality	
All population	16009.6	14963.0	1046.6	93.5	6.5	
Kazakhs	10096.8	9982.3	114.5	98.9	1.1	
Russians	3793.8	3748.3	45.5	98.8	1.2	
Uzbeks	457.0	435.8	21.2	95.4	4.6	
Ukrainians	333.0	52.5	280.5	15.8	84.2	
Uigurs	224.7	190.9	33.8	85.0	15.0	
Tatars	204.2	104.2	100.0	51.0	49.0	
Germans	178.4	30.4	148.0	17.0	83.0	
Korean	100.4	36.1	64.3	36.0	64.0	

Population by ethnic group and native language

Source: the Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan

8,992,200 people (74.0 percent) of population aged 15 and above know Kazakh language, including 4,320,200 men or 75.3 percent of all men and 4,672,000 women or 72.8 percent of all women. Kazakhs in the age group 15 years and above (7,320,418) selected the following extent of the Kazakh language skills: 7,198,880 (98.3 percent) people understand spoken language, 6,986,634 (95.4 percent) read well and 6,819,898 (93.2 percent) write well. Along with the state language, the Russian language is used widely, as evidenced by the following data: 11,471,000 (94.4 percent) people aged 15 and above understand spoken language, 10,724,900 people (88.2 percent) read well, 10,309,500 people (84.8 percent) write well. In urban areas, the level of Russian language skills is higher than in rural areas.

Western scholars always point out the collapse of any political activities which would protect ethnic minority interests in Kazakhstan, excluding those which are under state support. In this context Peyrose also avers that any alteration in the status of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan would effect in a diverse response to their minority status: "passive allegiance to a new state, elucidated by the establishment of the linguistic or cultural integration and the progress of a double Russian-Kazakh identity". The latter entail unforeseen practices of building inter-ethnic relations (S. Peyrose, 2007).

Few works on the challenges of language implementation in Kazakhstan have dwelt upon the quintessence of Kazakh as well as Russian nationalisms as "language of ethnic continuity and also of radical change" (Hutchinson 2004). J. Hutchinson persists that nationalists are capable to rationalize innovation because of the "layered" nature of the ethnic history and at the same time because of their mobility to craft a new identity on the foundation of previous one and to legitimize new national ventures. The state itself is unable to build a new ideology but the state can use creative perspectives of political and cultural identities for its own objectives and thus propose more attractive thoughts to the country's population.

The language which offers a prospect to be a part of the society and entrance to better living values is one of them. In the same way, before the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the Russian language had been the "key to the door" that guides to extensive opportunities for a brighter prospect. Subsequently the collapse of the USSR, the shift of the Russian language dominance to that of Kazakh in a new independent republic appeared to be unavoidable. The state and the society thrived in supporting this process comparatively peacefully. The post-Soviet Kazakhstan changed from the publicly entrenched Russian as a lingua franca to the linguistically "less developed" native Kazakh during the first decade of Kazakhstan's independence.

There are copious matters that would be addressed in this context such as what were the political plans (particularly, the dilemma of the status of Kazakh as the state language) of Kazakh leadership in terms of nation building processes in Kazakhstan? To what level, given that these agendas were practical, was the state eager to admit some of the Kazakh nationalists' stress to make their own program more striking? Lastly, is it possible to estimate the position of the state in the execution of the Kazakh language and single out the key reasons that have determined the procedure?

In this context according to the Language Law (1989) and Constitution of Kazakhstan, Kazakh is the state language, while Russian is declared to be the language of interethnic communication - a term which the Russians of Kazakhstan are not pleased with. President N. Nazarbayev, who deeds to hold the multi- ethnic country together, has proposed that Russian be made an "official" language, although still mediocre in status to Kazakh. Only 2 percent of Russians and 40 percent of ethnic Kazakhs in Kazakhstan maintained to be convinced in Kazakh in 1992.

While some Slavic movements, such as LAD, campaign for making Russian the second state language, more moderate Slavic activists protest not so much against the law as such, but about its violation by administrative bodies resulting in the reduction of job opportunities for Russian-speakers, especially in regions where Russians constitute a minority. In December 1992,

15,000 demonstrators in Northern Kazakhstan demanded that Russian should be recognised as a second state language. In December 1994, the Parliament of Kazakhstan refused to discuss the status of Russian as a second state language. This issue remains an important political issue in Kazakhstan.


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
Analysis of inter-ethnic situation shows, that in Kazakhstan the main cause of adverse demographic and migratory trends are of socio-economic nature. In addition, the elimination of previously existing cultural symbols (crumbling of internationalism, a sense of a unified country in the former Soviet Union and the dominance of Russian language and culture, etc.), approval of new cultural values (growth of Kazakh ethnic consciousness, the expansion of the scope of the national language, renaming settlements), brought a deep sense of dissatisfaction among the majority of the Slavic population. Psychological distress was one of the important factors of emigration of Russian-speaking population.

Despite this inter-ethnic situation, the country remained relatively stable. According to the expert survey, among the factors that can destabilize the social life, ethnic relations took only eighth place (Arinova, 2001). The consequence of migration and demographic processes reduced the number of non-Kazakh nationalities and increased the number of Turkic peoples, which stimulated the ethnic and demographic polarization between the largest ethnic groups of Kazakhstan's society, Kazakhs and Slavs.

In this context, the ethnic composition of Kazakhstan's population is divided into major groups such as Kazakhs, Russian and ethnic minorities. Each group has specific relevance to the Kazakh nation-state identity. The Kazakhs have identified themselves with Kazakhstan, as they considered it as the only country where they can achieve the national and state identity. The Russian population in their identification strategy went for a compromise between Kazakhstan and Russia. They are less integrated into the public-political life, as well as distant from the political, economic and socio-cultural resources of power. In the sphere of interethnic relations, they are more worried about the problems of language, education, representation in government (Kurganskaya, 2001:29).

Substantial changes in migration patterns in Kazakhstan took place during 1999-2008 but it was in contrast to the previous one in many ways. For example, there was a shift in the emigration trend in 2007, when evacuation started to cultivate. Migration dynamics upturned in 2005, when inflows of people started to fall. Migration of educated and younger population happened in 2007-2008. Immigration - especially of Kazakh ethnicity – started to decline significantly from about 2005.





Source: Agency on statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Large outflow of Russian and other ethnic groups took place in 1999-2006. Huge inflow of ethnic Kazakhs to Kazakhstan took place in the same period. However, the process of gradual lowering of emigration from Kazakhstan reversed in 2007, as the most educated (with higher education) and young population groups emigrated. Increase in the outflow of the most mobile part of population occurred in 2007. This fact proves the point that people in Kazakhstan adjust rapidly to economic incentives by migrating to country with relatively higher wages and better employment.

Dual Citizenship:

With regard to the issue of citizenship, another interesting policy of the Kazakh government has been the call for immigration of ethnic Kazakhs living outside the country to Kazakhstan. After gaining independence, the Kazakh government adopted a policy to welcome Kazakh residents in other countries 'back to the homeland'. It has been estimated that there are more than 3.5 million Kazakhs living outside Kazakhstan in 30 countries worldwide. In 1992 alone, more than 60,000 Kazakhs migrated from Mongolia and other CIS states and resettled in Kazakhstan with the financial aid of the Kazakh government. As Liu argues, "... such policies certainly have serious consequences for inter-ethnic relations. Excessive assertion of ethnonationalism of the titular nationality is at odds with the goal of ethnic harmony", Liu further states that:

"Ethnic Kazakh immigrants are known as oralmans – a term essence "people who came back." They come from athwart Asia – largely from former Soviet republics, but also from countries such as Afghanistan and Mongolia. The Kazakh government has encouraged the Kazakh Diaspora to come back since 1993. Many of today's oralmans are descendants of expatriates who fled Soviet collectivization makes in the 1920s and 30s. Others, such as most Kazakhs in Uzbekistan, basically found themselves outside the Kazakh SSR as a consequence of Moscow's infrequent shifting of Central Asian borders during the Soviet era."

Compared to the Kazakhs living in Kazakhstan, as Zardykhan argues, the repatriated Kazakhs are believed to have stronger nationalistic feelings. He states:

"In particular, those who came from non-USSR countries such as China, Mongolia and Turkey are bound strongly to Kazakh language and traditions. As a means of Kazakh nation building and to balance out the heavy population of Russians in northern districts, many of the newly repatriated Kazakh families were distributed in northern and eastern districts and to big cities with large Russian populations. For instance, almost no Kazakh family from Mongolia was settled in Shymkent, one of the most Kazakh-populated cities."

In Kazakhstan, the 1995 constitution granted citizenship to anyone residing in Kazakhstan at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is a civic and inclusive form of action. However, Kazakh government's call for immigration of ethnic Kazakhs residing in neighbouring and other countries of the world 'back to the homeland' is a policy based on 'assumed blood ties' a crucial sign of a primordial approach in politics which inevitably leads to the strengthening of ethnic fragmentation in terms of the insiders and outsiders in the republic (Geertz, 1973).

Education:

After its independence, Kazakhstan had to build a basis for a common identity for its citizens, and among other things, this required implementation of policies related to promotion of the culture of Kazakhs and other nationalities by education. Thus, education has been an important instrument in shaping the new generations of the country. The policies chosen and followed by the government give clues about the type of nation-building in Kazakhstan, since it determines the long-term intentions of the state apparatus.

In Kazakhstan, the education system consists of Kazakh-medium and Russian-medium schools, besides 3.3 percent minority language schools which Uzbek, Uygur, Tajik, German, Tatar etc. that school children attend. Parents have the freedom to determine the language of their children's education. The curricula in these schools are identical and it is only the medium

which is different. Second by languages - Kazakh in Russian-medium schools and Russian in Kazakh-medium schools - are educated as obligatory school subjects from grade one. Furthermore, school alumnae have the choice of enduring their education in universities in Kazakhstan or of going to Russia to study. These efforts of encouraging Kazakh language are accompanied by 'Kazakhization' policies. New school textbooks are written in line with the new ideology and teachers are required to use the Kazakhistani books (although of course many schools still use the Russian and old Soviet texts alongside the new ones) (Smagulova, 2005: 6-7).

However, Russian language has been dominant in Kazakhstan and its public life. According to 2009 census, more people still know Russian well than any other language. To illustrate, 75 percent of all population are fluent in Russian. The number of Kazakh language schools is rising, while the number of Russian schools is declining. The number of Kazakh schools was 2,768 in 1991 (34.1 percent of all), which increased to 3,357 in 1999, and the number of Russian schools decreased from 3,641 to 2,412 in the same period (Olcott, 2002: 178). On the other hand, difficulties in the education system of the country increased due to the new language policy. Since there is a lack of Kazakh textbooks, and there are fewer competent people to teach technical subjects in Kazakh as the curriculum requires. As a result, there is need for competent staff and translating and writing textbooks, manuals in Kazakh language.

It is not uncommon that the people who are fluent in Kazakh lack the technical vocabulary necessary to change their instruction language, because most Kazakhs received their higher education in Russian. Besides, in rural places, lack of staff is the main problem, as the rural areas are unattractive especially to younger teachers (UN Development Report, 2004). Russian is also still the dominant language of higher education. For example in 1999, 72 percent of the college students attended higher education in Russian while 27 percent in Kazakh and 1 percent in Uzbek, English and German (Olcott, 2002: 179). This shows that even if the higher education in Kazakh language is available in a broad range of disciplines today, the quality of higher education in Russian is broader than in the Kazakh language and the variety of available subjects in Russian is broader than in Kazakh. What is more, even Kazakh groups use Russian textbooks, especially in technical subjects such that in 2003, only 15percent of the textbooks were in Kazakh (Fierman, 2006: 112-113).

However, despite such difficulties, share of Kazakh medium classes in total class enrollment increased from 34.1 percent in 1991 to 52.1 percent in 2001 and to 56.0 percent in 2004 in Kazakhstan. One of the reasons of the increase in Kazakh-medium schools is naturally the growing percentage of the Kazakhs in the population, in other words, demographic change is in favor of Kazakhs. The share of the ethnic Kazakh students in Kazakh-Medium Schools rather than Russian-Medium Classes has greatly increased in Kazakhstan, from about 66 percent to about 80 percent. Hence, the proportion of ethnic Kazakh children attending Russian classes declined from about 34 percent in 1990 to about 20 percent in 1995 and remained so thereafter. It is clear that the majority of the Kazakhs attend the Kazakh Medium schools in Kazakhstan (Fierman, 2006: 106).

In this context research findings suggest that those students who study with Kazakh as a language of instruction have lower achievements than those with Russian as a language of instruction (Fierman, 2006). It may seem ironic, but the language law was supported by a major commercial crusade - "It is a responsibility of each resident of Kazakhstan to expertise in the state language". One can ask how? To a great amount it imitates the regime's approach - practical ways have been introduced for a wider use of Kazakh language and there is a clear ideological policy direction in this regard.

While according to the Article 14 of the Constitution it is forbidden to discriminate on the basis of language that no one shall be subject to any discrimination for reason of language, the actual policies in practice are the reverse. To illustrate, the Russians believe that there is

discrimination against them which is evident from their downsizing from government positions and even from private enterprises, while there are no formal legislative restrictions on Russian language usage. For instance, more than half of Russian students said that ethnic origin would determine their career chances (Olcott, 2002: 182). Furthermore, a package containing legislative acts and implementation documents about education has been enacted, including a document of the State Conception of Education in the Republic of Kazakhstan, which seems supporting the ethnic nation-building process.

Therefore, the educational policies in Kazakhstan should be evaluated with language policies and employment policies, because as Roy (2000) has indicated, at the level of education local students are systematically favoured due to the application of language laws. When the increasing number of Kazakh Medium schools and a simultaneous decrease in Russian ones, is considered with the language policy, it can be stated that the educational policies of Kazakhstan are rather ethnic than civic.

Religion:

It was for the first time in 2009 that the census programme included a question about religion. The census data showed that 70.2 percent of the populations are Muslims and 26.3 percent are Christians. Islam is practiced by 98.3 percent of Kazakhs, 99.1 percent of Uzbeks, 98.4 percent of Uyghurs, 99.1 percent of Turks, 94.8 percent of Azerbaijanis, 98.9 percent of Dungans, 98.3 percent of Kurds, 97.8 percent of Tajiks, 93.7 percent of Chechens and 96.7 percent of Kyrgyz.

Representatives of Slavic ethnic groups account for a large group of Christians: 91.6 percent of Russians, 90.7 percent of Ukrainians and 90.2 percent of Belarusians. 90.1 percent of Poles and 81.6 percent of Germans also follow Christianity. Judaism is not widespread in the country; the share of population practicing Buddhism is also small.

Religion/Denomination	Number of associations		
Islam	2,144		
Russian Orthodox Church	270		
Roman Catholic Church	95		
Protestant associations	1,147		
Judaism	27		
Buddhism	4		
non-traditional religions	49		

Registered Religious Associations in Kazakhstan as of June 2007

Source: http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2007/06/25050_en.pdf

The majority of population practicing Islam lives in South Kazakhstan Oblast, 2,307,300 people (93.4 percent of total population) and Almaty Oblast, 1,458,800 people (80.7percent). Christianity is more prevalent among people living in Karaganda Oblast, 607,200 people (45.3 percent), East-Kazakhstan Oblast, 520,900 people (37.3 percent) and Kostanai Oblast, 474,400 people (53.6 percent).

There are more than 40 different religious confessions and denominations represented in the Kazakhstan today. According to official statistics, there were 3,855 religious associations registered as in June 2007.

Islam and the Russian Orthodox Church have the largest number of adherents although the number of Protestant Christian congregations is about four times higher than Russian Orthodox churches. The large number of Protestant Christian organizations is explained by the efforts of Protestant Christian missionary organizations which recieve funds from the West to recruit local ethnic Russians and Kazakhs.

In 2008 Kazakhstan adopted the law on religion which has lessened the legal security of religious autonomy provided in the Constitution of Kazakhstan. Moreover the amendments done in this law in 2005 also strengthen registration necessities. It also explains that religious groups should index with both the central and local Government of every regions in which they have parishioners. The rule is defined in this law is for registration, a religious association should have minimum ten members and propose an application to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). Religious legislation persists that all persons are free to perform their religion "alone or together with others."

The Government may eliminate registration based upon an inadequate number of supporters or inconsistencies amid the requirements of a religious organization's contract and the law. Under the Law on Public Associations, a registered association, including a religious cluster, can have all activities suspended by court order for a period of 3 to 6 months for disobedience of the Constitution or laws or for methodical quest of activities that oppose the charter and bylaws of the organization as registered. For the duration of a deferral, the organization concerned is banned from dialogue with the media on behalf of the organization; holding meetings, assemblies, or services; and undertaking pecuniary dealings other than meeting ongoing contractual compulsions as paying salaries (Dave, 2005).

Participation in parliament:

Statistics shows that the representation of major ethnic groups of Kazakhstan in government agencies is quite disproportionate to their share in the population. Therefore the claim of ownership by all the inhabitants in the construction of the state, and more shared responsibility for its future is questionable.

By the time of independence, the Kazakh (39.7 percent) and Russian share (37.8 percent) of the population in Kazakhstan was almost equal (1989), and together with the Ukrainians and Belorussians, Russian citizens held majority in the republic, (43.9 percent). Moreover, majority of Russians were also employed in Kazakhstan, ensuring the functioning of its economy, and accounting for most of the skilled engineers and technicians. Kazakhs at the same time occupied a dominant position in the government and the majority of intelligentsia, which determined the rapid concentration of power in their hands. Kazakhstan's parliamentary history shows a constant increase in the proportion of the titular ethnic group among the deputies of both chambers. As a result of March elections in 1994, in the Supreme Soviet (common name for legislative bodies), percentage of Russians was 21 percent, while the Kazakh was 58 percent of the seats.

In the election in 1995 the situation improved somewhat – in the lower chamber there were 43 Kazakhs, 20 Russians and 4 members of other nationalities were elected. The share of Russian deputies was about 30 percent, which seems to have been somewhat lower than their proportion in the total population, but much better than the results of previous elections. Similar were the results of elections to the upper chamber of parliament which in 1995 had 32 Kazakhs, 13 Russian (30percent), one Uighur and one Ukrainian. But the level of representation of Russians in the Kazakhstan's parliament has declined markedly. In the elections of 1999 in the upper chamber of parliament 14 Kazakhs, no Russians and two representatives of other ethnic groups were elected. At the same time, two Russians were among the seven senators specifically designated by the President in accordance with the constitution. In the lower chamber elections of 1999 Kazakhs were 58 and there were 19 Russian. In general, the share of Kazakhs, who formed in 1999 53.4 percent of the total population, accounted for 75.3 percent, and Russians, whose share reached 30 percent had only 24.7 percent of the deputies of the Majilis.

In the new list of members of the lower chamber of Kazakh Parliament, elected in August 2007, 82 Kazakhs, 17 Russians (15.9 percent) were elected, two German and one Belorussian, Balkar, Koreans, Ukrainians, Uzbeks and Uighurs. As per the data on January 1, 2006 Russians comprised 26.1 percent of the population, their share of the lower chamber was 1.6 times less. As a kind of compensation one of the two elected Vice-Chairman of the Majilis, was an ethnic

Russian S.A Dyachenko, who has big experience in politics, and the other representative of the Russian ethnicity A.S Sudin- the deputy chairman of the Senate.

According to Deputy Minister of Information of Kazakhstan A. Ryabchenko who submitted the August 14, 2007 report of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, there were 79 percent of Kazakh statesmen, 14.5 percent Russian, 0.9 percent Ukrainians. Thus, the Russian public officials were 1.8 times less, and the Kazakhs - 1.3 times greater than their proportion in the population of the republic. Among the ministers of K. Massimov's government there are almost no Russians, as well as representatives of other European ethnic groups. This is one of the important challenges for Kazakhstan in future to reduce the disproportionate representation of each ethnic identity in parliament and other governmental organizations.

Administrative and Territorial distributions:

Kazakhs have a prevailing share (of total population) in Kyzylorda (95.3 percent), Atyrau (91.1 percent) and Mangystau (88.3 percent) Oblasts, as well as in Aktobe, South Kazakhstan, West Kazakhstan and Zhambyl Oblasts where their share is over 70 percent. The share of Kazakhs does not exceed 50 percent of total population in Pavlodar, Akmola, Karaganda, Kostanai and North Kazakhstan Oblasts.

Ethnic differentiation is most obvious in urban and rural areas. Urban/rural distribution of population by ethnicity is as follows: 47.9 percent of Kazakhs, 72.8 percent of Russians, 74.6 percent of Tatars, 55.8 percent of Ukrainians, 50.1 percent of Germans, 42.7 percent of Uyghur, 83.8 percent of Koreans, 27.8 percent of Turks, 48.8 percent of Azerbaijanis, 52.8 percent of Belarusians, 17.0 percent of Dungans, 20.8 percent of Kurds, 49.8 percent of Chechens, 68.3 percent of Kyrgyz and 43.6 percent of other ethnic populations live in urban areas. The remaining part of these ethnic groups lives in rural areas.

Political Parties:

There are three types of Political parties in Kazakhstan first, those that support the President, second, those parties which are formed especially by members of the elite, and third, those that are separated from the political system. In this context Nazarbayev's Nur Otan is the most significant and only party represented in parliament. A highly preventive "Law on Political Parties" forbids to creation of new party on basis of ethnic and religious support thus averting the enlistment of two potentially influential causes of opposition-Russian based parties which would be a challenge for Nazarbayev's nation-building efforts or may even be a spotlight for secessionism in Kazakhstan, and Islamist parties which would be repeal Kazakhstan's secular practice and excel the President by the religious card. A resilient section is the obligation that wants parties to have minimum 50,000 members representing all regions and the major cities of Kazakhstan, ruling out the prospect of provincial parties which would act as a medium for ethnic interests.

An interesting fact is that despite limitations on forming an Islamic political party, Islam remains a prospective point for anti-Nazarbayev opponent. All other Central Asian leaders - politically cultured and approved during the Soviet era - Nazarbayev has been cautious to differentiate between Islam as a private religion and a political vigor. The collapse of communism also left an ideological void that many western observers feared would be filled by Islamic fundamentalism. As on 15 January 2012 usual election of maslikhat and extraordinary elections of Majilis were held where according to Central Election Commission, People's Democratic Party "Nur Otan" got 80.99 percent of votes; Democratic Party of Kazakhstan "Ak Zhol" got only 7.47 percent; Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan also got 7.19 percent; where Kazakhstani Social-Democratic Party "Aul" got 1.19 percent; All-National Social Democratic Party got 1.68 percent; Democratic Party "Adilet" got 0.66 percent; and Party of Patriots of Kazakhstan got merely 0.83 percent. This difference between main party "Nur Otan" and other is one of the challenges for Kazakhstan government for forming a multicultural state.

Though, there are many objective aspects which would act as foremost challenges of interethnic relationships and multiculturalism in Kazakhstan like low living standards, joblessness and the occurrence of crime, lack of authorized culture, and manifestation of the tendency of ethnic alienation.

In recent times there are new and external aspects which are upsetting the state of interethnic relations, as a chance of geopolitical division especially on ethno-religious foundation, and reduced tolerance of people's consciousness; the materialization of the menace of military-political insecurity in the region, the prospect of humanitarian adversities and the arrival of refugees, unlawful activities of radicals, terrorist and fundamentalist groups under the justification of religious thoughts, the increase of mass culture, alien to the state of mind of Kazakh civilization through western media, religious groups, non-compliance of legislation in the country, the growth of intercontinental crime; politicization of religions and ethnically oriented associations. These factors would be a destabilizing cause on the state of interethnic relations. Thus, these factors are the focus of civic authorities and policy makers on how policy regarding multiculturalism and inter-ethnic relation would be created and implemented in Kazakhstan society.

Prospects and policies of multiculturalism in Kazakhstan

The priority of ethnic policy allowed the state to quickly form the foundations of national statehood, to mobilize spiritual and other resources of the Kazakh population. Integration of intra-Kazakh population turned out to be a decisive factor in the survival of the young nation in its transition period.

The constitutional/ legal documents accord the Kazakhs the status of state-nation, and the nation's core. It is reflected in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR dated October 25, 1990, which recognized that the Kazakhs are the state-nation and ethnic and cultural core of Kazakhstan's statehood. Constitutional Law "On State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan" dated December 16, 1991 highlights "the right of the Kazakh nation to self-determination." The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated January 28, 1993 also focuses on the national character of Kazakh statehood, presenting it as a form of self-determined state of Kazakh nation (Sultanov, 2001).

The first stage of the state ethno-multiculturalism was organically fit into the logic of national and spiritual revival of the Kazakh nation. However, this process within this period has not been adequately and fully disclosed due to several factors.

Firstly, ethno-cultural weakness of the Kazakh population and its unwillingness to be an independent engine of national processes in the country. The initiative came primarily from "above", the driving force behind national processes was the Kazakh elite that put forward the national problem at the level of public policy. Non-expression of the natural aspirations of the majority of the Kazakhs for national spiritual revival became one of the main obstacles to the full development of national processes in mind of the Kazakh people.

Secondly, the potential of the national elite has been limited. This was manifested in the fact that, the actions of the elite were limited to the priority use of administrative resources, and the internal contradiction of the elite in connection with a narrow understanding of the basic essence of national processes in the country. The result was an artificial limitation of these processes by the achievement of specific, short-term goals.

Thirdly, inadequate understanding of the nature of ethnic problem from the side of general population. This was the cause of the problem of politicization of ethnicity. Unilateral prioritization of indigenous population and its identification in national-ethnic and religious basis led to ethnic polarization in society. Ethnicity as a collective means of pressure became one of the most acute political problems under the current phase.

The end of the formal approval process, the foundation of national statehood, strengthening the national power elite led to ethnic nationalism by the end of the first phase, and exhausted its potential for mobilization. The dominance of ethnic principles of general civil values led to disintegration of attitudes in society. This is partly reflected in the fact that the ethnicization of social consciousness spurred the process of "alienation" between the two largest ethnic groups, Kazakhs and Russians in Kazakhstan (Arinova, 2001).

The Second stage starts with the adoption of the Constitution (1995) which enshrined the civil principles of general statehood with territorial model of the nation. In the document there is no division of Kazakhstan among the representatives of the titular and non-titular nation, which stimulated the integration processes in society. This step was dictated by the fact that the state ethno-nationalism, which gave special status to the Kazakh nation, found no support from a large proportion of the population.

In this context, ethnic policy was aimed at the formation of the Kazakh nation as a political community of citizens, based on the principles of civil society. This means the formation of Kazakhstan's state-based model of modernist nation-building was based on the principles of citizenship. Thereupon, the strategic goal of the state was to conduct a deliberate policy within the framework of nation-building. The need to achieve a stable inter-ethnic situation in the long term, overcoming ethnic separatism by the formation of a single nation needed to go to a new, supra-ethnic level of integration.

Such integration is possible only on the basis of a sound economic base, lack of which causes the disintegration processes. It should be noted that economic difficulties in Kazakhstan stimulated departure of 10percent of Kazakh citizens and provoked inter-ethnic tensions in some regions. Today, Kazakhstan's economy has sufficient integrative potential to consolidate the Kazakh society. Full usage of the economic potential depends on the ability of society and national bourgeoisie, designed to overcome ethnic tensions in order to resolve the priority problems of the society. Independent political organizations would promote the integration of population policy into a single nation, and the different regions of the country - into a single economic space (Kadyrzhanov, 1999).

In this context, the relatively common cultural values and philosophical orientation of the vast majority of the population is the main resource of Kazakh society in achieving this strategic goal. It promotes the integration of society in the supra-ethnic level, reduces the conflicts.

Along with the resources, there is a fact of deterrent development of ethno-political processes in a given direction. Kazakh society is inherent in its low ability to perceive the modernist values. The reforms "from above" did not cause activation of civil positions in society. Cultural rejection of Western values in their formal recognition is a fundamental contradiction in Kazakh society. In this context, the concentration of public policy in addressing the challenges to stabilize the inter-ethnic situation in the short term seems inappropriate. Today there is need to conduct basic research to develop its own model of nation-building, designed to meet the challenges of the situation in the medium and long term.

Ethnic division of Kazakh society was the result of ethno-political processes in Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet period. Mobilization of Kazakhs stimulated the mobilization of other ethnic groups that led to ethnic polarization in society. This process is most manifested in the interethnic competition between the Kazakhs and Russians, the largest ethnic segments of society that promoted the growth of ethnic tensions in Kazakhstan society. Despite this, in Kazakhstan from 1991 to 2001, large-scale ethnic conflict did not happen. This was a consequence of the following factors:

First: The conflict on an ethnic basis is driven by a conflict of interest and conflict of values. The contradictions in the interests of the most concern the elite strata of society. Therefore, the appearance of conflict of interests to a greater extent depends on the position of the elites of ethnic groups. The conflict involves the basic values of people and affects the foundations of national identity. In Kazakhstan, there was a compromise between the elites of the ethnic groups that contributed to the resolution of conflict of interest. The common cultural value

orientations in the vast majority of the population led to the absence of conflict of values in Kazakhstan.

Second: The lack of historical forms and traditions of orthodox Islam in the minds of the Kazakhs, and the absence of radical religious traditions in the Orthodox environment of Kazakhstan's society.

An analysis of ethnic conflicts, which took place till now, has shown that irredentist conflicts were more predictable, organized and managed, but potentially dangerous. Their resolution called for the use of political rather than violent methods. Ethno-social conflicts are not organized, but less dangerous to the state, because there are fewer policy areas concerned. They demanded a forceful resolution (Kurganskaya, 2001).

Kazakhs were very active in these ethnic conflicts. Ethnic conflicts were caused by a complex of problems associated with the transition period. An analysis of ethnic conflicts has shown that none of them had been finally resolved. All of them have acquired a latent form and retained the basic potential of ethno-conflict potential in ethnic areas which is twelve in numbers.

Ethnic areas were not isolated in the interior areas of the country and it was advantageous for Kazakhstan. These areas were located on the border with the territory of the State in which this compact ethnic group resided. This gave rise to separatist tendencies in ethnic media, which represented it as greatest threat to the state, threatening the territorial integrity of the country. Therefore, an important indicator in determining the ethno-conflict potential was the political mobilization of ethnic groups in the ethnic concerned area. In this context, the most politically organized force, which was based on the strength of their historic homeland, became the Russian population of the country. The problems of the politicization of ethnicity were associated with the presence of substantial number of Russians in the country.

But the concept of building a united civic nation in Kazakhstan is not the only model of nation-building, which is presents in the public and scientific discourse. A more radical model of the national community advanced Kazahization of non-titular ethnic groups, whose author is well-known Kazakh historian and political scientist Azimbai Ghali. In his article on "Kazakhs and Kazahization as ethno mobilization to create post-ethnic Kazakhstan," published in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (January 2004, 1) he considers the Kazakhization as one of the main conditions for survival and further development of Kazakhstan. According to him, "Kazahization of non-Kazakhs will expand the social base of Kazakhstan. Will create a broader base for ethnic Kazakh ethno competition, which is very useful effect on the growth of passionate fervor of the population of Kazakhstan. "At the same time under the Kazahization, he understands only civil and linguistic assimilation, and other types of acculturation as they are considered as desirable but not critical. Azimbai Ghali said the most real is the assimilation of Turkic and Muslim ethnic groups - Uzbeks, Uighurs, Turks and Kurds, who are closer to Kazakhs in language and religious terms.

At the same time the Kazakh language could become not only the mean of unification, but linguistic isolation of a large part of the citizens who would feel like strangers in Kazakhstan. As an alternative of assimilation, Azimbai Ghali considers three options for "protest" behavior of non-titular ethnic groups: segregation (care model in a closed community, self isolation, and passive resistance), resistance to all forms of assimilation (emigration, the political struggle within constitutional norms) and attempt to assimilate the assimilationists. Even to give the proximity to the Azimbay Ghali's theory for a single civic nation (civil and linguistic assimilation), the results of nation-building also cannot be those as are proclaimed in the "Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan" so far.

Speaking at the 15th Session of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev, submitted a draft project "Doctrine of National Unity," which would become the main ethno-national policy of the country for medium-term at least until 2020. It is in this context that it is essential to observe the key characteristics of the policy and then what is

the actual position of ethnic groups and try to find out its impact on the ethnic-equality in post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

The main feature of the doctrine is much more distinctive than previous programs and documents in the sphere of ethnic policy of the idea of formation of a civic nation, which should unite all citizens of Kazakhstan, regardless of their nationality or religious affiliation. However, the actual content of the doctrine shows that the core of the Kazakhstan state is the Kazakh language and culture, whereas the non-Kazakh people play the role of ethnic Diasporas. At the same time Kazakhstan has second largest Russian population after the CIS, and by the degree of dissemination and the social significance of Russian language it could claim to be a "country of the Russian world", which presently anticipated to commence the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia.

Introducing the draft "Doctrine of National Unity," President Nursultan Nazarbayev has formulated three main issues: what is meant by national unity; why it is important to be strengthened and what is its basis. The answers to these questions define the basic conceptual content of the doctrine. Under the national unity, he proposes to understand the "community united by ethnic, religious and other socio-cultural groups living in our country" that must be strengthened to ensure internal and external security, as well as the progressive development of the country. The basis of national unity are the three "pillars": 1) general history of the "dramatic pages," which should draw necessary lessons, and 2) shared values, determined by joint economic activities, creation of cultural heritage, as well as a joint celebration of the most important festivals, such as Day of spiritual accord, Kurban Ait, Easter, Christmas, and 3) a common future, due to the fact that "with independence, Kazakhstanis jointly made a free choice of their own destiny."

In basic terms, these provisions are included in the draft of the doctrine. Under the national unity it is understood as "the integrity of the existence of ethnic communities within a single state, a high degree of self-identification of citizens with the Republic of Kazakhstan, with the existing system of values and ideals." As a basis of national unity of Kazakhstani society the doctrine considers "shared values" that "consolidates the society into a unified whole". Of particular interest is the interpretation of the authors of the doctrine of common values, which should rally the multi-ethnic society of Kazakhstan into one. In addition to "general history", "involvement in the construction of a new state" and "shared responsibility for the destiny of the country and future generations of its citizens" in the doctrine emphasizes the need for respect "to the lifestyle, customs, feelings, opinions, ideas and beliefs of all ethnic groups, religions, social groups ", "Ethnic Diversity and Dialogue of Cultures ", as well as moral values such as respect for elders, respect for the institution of the family and tradition of hospitality.

Considering the proposed foundations in the doctrine of national unity, it should be noted that most of them are unlikely to contribute to the formation of a single civic nation in Kazakhstan, as their unity, is very conditional.

Kazakhstan brings a common history, so that they live together on this earth, with a fair level of tolerance of the Kazakhs themselves, which are apparently favorable to most people living in Kazakhstan, including the most numerous of them - Russian. However, the overall history is not a guarantee of a shared future, and even vice versa, as there are different historical destinies of nations. In the world there were many ethnic groups which, because of certain historical reasons, for long time lived in one state, but then due to its territorial disintegration and migration were caught on opposite sides of the border.

The most problematic is the existence of common values to unite all peoples living in Kazakhstan into a single nation. Long-term co-residence and economic activity can lead to addiction of ethnicities to each other, but unlikely to give rise to common values. The creation and sharing of cultural heritage, especially as the symbiosis of Russian and Kazakh cultures in Kazakhstan has not been yet observed. Though there is talk about the great influence of the Great

Russian culture on Kazakh, merging of the two into one is not happening nor is likely to happen. In future, if Kazakhstan retains sufficiently large number of Russian population, there is a possibility of formation of a Russian subculture. However, there are calls for Muslim and Christian religious leaders to help establish an agreement for civil peace and religious differences between religions.

On the way to achieving the main goal - the creation of a single civic nation - the doctrine identifies five main objectives: strengthening the common Kazakh identity, the formation of an effective system of interaction of state bodies and civil institutions in the field of interethnic relations, the development of official language, the preservation and development of ethnocultural, linguistic identity of the peoples, as well as the fight against extremism, radicalism and human rights violations. However, means of forming a "common Kazakh identity" are not disclosed or described in general terms. Besides, no answer is provided to the main question - should all citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan associate themselves with it and how?

Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan could be the answer of this question and harmoniously fits into the system of life of the young sovereign state. This structure has the most positive impact on the implementation of the Republic of Kazakhstan policy of unity and equality of members of different nationalities and faiths. The Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan for the years of its activity has developed practical recommendations to ensure inter-ethnic harmony and political stability in the Republic of Kazakhstan. This non-political and non-governmental organization solves the problem of strengthening interethnic relation in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, the Assembly of the People reflects the entire spectrum of ideals and interests of all the peoples of Kazakhstan and each ethnic group separately. This is an important direction of the State policies aimed at preserving and strengthening inter-ethnic peace and accord in the country and to ensure that all citizens of Kazakhstan have equal access to social and economic rights and freedoms.

At present, the Assembly brings together and represents almost all 130 ethnic groups living in the regions of the republic. The Assembly, being an entirely new institution of civil society, recalls that the idea of a public institute for Ethnic Affairs was first expressed by the leader of the Nation in 1992 at the First Forum of the Peoples of Kazakhstan and in March 1995, it has found its practical expression and became a unique advisory corpse under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Going along with the country the Assembly has proved its relevance and urgency. Currently, the integration potential of the Assembly, its ability to consolidate the interests of ethnic groups, dialogue with the authorities, interethnic communication contributed to the establishment of the socio-political institution as one of the main instruments of national policy in Kazakhstan.

But this is also a fact that Assemble of peoples of Kazakhstan has its own limitation because it does not have any constitutional rights. Hence the policy on multiculturalism to maintain the ethnic prosperity still needs to be defined in a right way for the future of Kazakhstan society.

Conclusion Multiculturalism in Kazakhstan also evolved from the same laws as for other peoples of the world. The general scheme of ethno-genesis process is determined as follows: individual genera, tribes, tribal unions, ethnicity, nation and multicultural state. This process is not straightforward and occurred inconsistently, through fragmentation, assimilation, crossing; it could stop for a while and then resume, but under the new historical conditions.

The history of the ethno-genesis of the Kazakh people should be considered in the complex of historical, archaeological, ethnographic, linguistic, and anthropological sciences. It is known that the Kazakh ethnic group evolved mainly from autochthonous tribes and tribal unions that anciently inhabited the vast territory of Kazakhstan. The formation of nation has been associated with the major events of ethno-political antiquity and in early middle ages, with the evolution of economic forms and the progressive changes in social relations, the establishment and strengthening of feudalism.

Continuing after gaining its independence as a result of the collapse of Soviet Union Kazakhstan started its pursuit for a new national identity in 1991. It was natural that the starting point was not a fresh start onto which a new national identity could be written. Instead, historical, pre-Soviet identities that persisted in different forms during the Soviet era were the first ones that the Kazakh policy-makers used as resources for building the Kazakh nation. However, building a viable national identity that is inclusive for all the citizens living in the territory of Kazakhstan is not an easy task, because of the presence of the high proportion of non-Kazakh population, especially Russians. The process of nation-building is critical, because of the clash of ethnic and civic elements.

The demographic structure affects the policy choices of the policymakers in contemporary Kazakhstan (dual citizenship issue, north-south difference of ethnic structure etc,). In a similar vein, Kazakh policymakers have also been trying to shift the loyalties of the Kazakhs from subnational/tribal identities towards a collective Kazakh identity, while pre-existing traditions and cultural resources of the Kazakhs have been selected while implementing the policies for building a viable Kazakh identity (i.e. state symbols, cultural policies, and celebrations). This is one of the planks used by the nation-builders in Kazakhstan for the implementation of ethnic policies concerning Kazakh values that ethnic policies are necessary for the formation of unitary Kazakh identity as the sub-national/tribal identities, which could not have been eradicated by the Soviet policies, obstruct the nation-building process.

The presence of the high proportion of non-Kazakhs and Russified ethnic Kazakhs force the nation-builders to adopt more civic policies (i.e. elevation of the Russian to the official status, cancellation of the language law making the knowledge of the Kazakh language mandatory, prevalence of the Russian in especially higher education) in the short-run, nation builders will push for more ethnic policies (i.e. further emphasis on the Kazakh language, culture and values) in the long-run. Therefore, even if the nation-building process in Kazakhstan has civic components in the short-run, the process is more ethnic in the long-run.

This situation somehow leads to negative aspects of multiculturalism based on ethnopolitical sphere. The main factors of the negative aspects of ethnic and ethno-political situation in Kazakhstan include the following points.

1. The lack of a clearly defined and a holistic concept of a national policy of Kazakhstan. Until recently, the lack of a clear definition of national policy changes as the main vectors of ethnic policy, depending on the conditions of the situation. Currently, this factor is the reason to aggravate tension in the ethno-political sphere of Kazakhstan.

2. There is no special body that would deal with the implementation and coordination of ethno-political course of the state. The Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan due to the fact that, legally, is not a public authority may not legitimately coordinate the work of government institutions, particularly local authorities, to implement the existing provisions of the ethnic policy.

3. Principles, symbols, values on which it would be possible to merge or consolidate Kazakhstan's ethnic groups into a single nation are still not developed. In many ways, the situation is derived from the still ongoing consolidation of state-Kazakh ethnic group. This is substantiated by enduring struggle within the ethnic group for economic, power and Information Resources (manifestations of tribalism), regional division, including through rural-urban Kazakhs. That is, the indigenous ethnic group in this case is still in the stage of transition from ethnicity to a single political community.

4. Clashes among the various ethnic groups in Kazakhstan are largely made possible because of the inefficient state policy in the orb of inter-ethnic relations. In the modern history of Kazakhstan, periodically there have been ethnic conflicts, which suggest that in the relations between Kazakhs permanently latent tensions are present. In many ways, this is due to the fact that inter-ethnic conflicts find their settlement just as they open manifestations, without a full prevention work. In addition, there is reason to believe that inter-ethnic clashes often become possible due to corruption and other offenses of public authorities where they are detrimental to the interests of some ethnic groups, satisfy social and economic interests of others.

5. The so-called problem of the linguistic and status issues manifests itself in dissatisfaction of the Kazakhs with the dynamics of implementation of the Kazakh and social functions of the state language with respect to the Slavic ethnic groups - the status of the Russian language and the translation office in the Kazakh language. In addition, the Kazakhs and non-indigenous ethnic groups in Kazakhstan are not satisfied with their social status infringement upon their social and economic interests. It is also believe that their constitutional right of access to the political process (public decision-making) has been limited. This problem threatens to become a factor of division, not only of marginalized section of the Kazakhstani society, but also the elite of the Kazakh people.

However, despite the above, currently factors of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kazakhstan are sporadic. They do not appear openly and publicly. In many cases, there are latent ethnic tensions and are not expressed in physical acts of violence, such as poorly diagnosed phenomena as ethno-cultural isolation, ethnic and social exclusion, economic competition and a high level of mutual distrust between ethnic groups. For example, when closed ethnic groups, not having the strength and power deviates from the explicit expression of its discontent and avoids overt conflict, the conflict is still persists, but the open acknowledgement of the conflict is not there.

Thus the analysis of multiculturalism and interethnic relations in terms of dominant and minority groups reveals that there is significant correlation between ethnic disparity and interethnic relations in Kazakhstan. In other words, ethnic disparities influenced and determined inter-ethnic group relations in the society. Dominant groups frequently interact with other dominant groups and have fewer interactions with minority groups.

Thus, ethnic identity and multiculturalism are interrelated and mutually reinforcing in a society like Kazakhstan. Dominant group of Kazakhs has the highest degrees of ethnic enclosure, and minority groups have the lowest. In turn, ethnic stratification is an important principle to organize the relationships of dominant and minority groups in a plural society. Ethnic disparities and capricious measure of ethnic inclusion among ethnic groups gives augments to plural society as in Kazakhstan. Public policy of ethnic nationalism has become a decisive factor in consolidating the foundations of national statehood in the country. The process of politicization of ethnicity has caused disintegrative tendencies. The efforts of public policy have focused on the implementation of the modernist model of nation-building on the principles of citizenship. Ethnic and language policies favouring the titular nationality of Kazakhs and socio-economic difficulties triggered departure of the population beyond the borders of the country. It can be said that multiethnic composition of the population has bi-ethnic structure.

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